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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes empirically the relationship between no-fault 
divorce legislation and the divorce rates of American states. No-fault 
legislation is defined to include recent (post-1969) statutes based on 
the principle of marital breakdown as well as separation grounds for 
divorce where the requisite period of separation is one year or less. 
Divorce rates are measured by an index designed to reflect both the mag­
nitude of the rate and the amount of change in the rate during the pe­
riod 1960-1978. A cross-sectional research design is used involving 
correlation and regression analysis. It was hypothesized that the pres­
ence of no-fault divorce law in a state contributes to an increase in 
the divorce rate of that state. Additional hypotheses were presented 
relating each of the additional independent variables to the state di­
vorce rate.
The major hypothesis was not supported. ’ Results indicate that the 
type of divorce law present in a state does not influence the state’s 
divorce rate. This finding supports previous research on the impact of 
no-fault legislation on divorce rates. Four other hypotheses were ac­
cepted. Migration, unemployment, and age distribution were shown to be 
positively related to divorce rates; Catholicism was negatively related 
to divorce rates.
Additional analysis was undertaken in which the divorce law was 
viewed as the dependent variable and the.,divorce rate as an independent 
variable. A weak relationship was found, suggesting that no-fault di­
vorce legislation might be a response to increasing divorce rates 
rather than a potential catalyst for further increase in the rates. 
Further empirical research is needed to examine this possibility more 
fully.
A conceptual framework based on exchange theory and field theory 
is presented to predict and explain the relationship between divorce 
law and divorce behavior. Divorce laws are identified as a social bar­
rier to divorce. Utilizing a problems perspective, in which divorce is 
characterized as a social problem, the relationship between divorce 
laws and divorce rates is discussed in terms of social control and sys­
tem stability. Concepts of societal scale and organic solidarity are 
used throughout to account for the role of social change in understand­
ing the institutions of the law and the family in modern society. Some 
of the functional aspects of divorce and of no-fault divorce legisla­
tion are discussed in the concluding chapter.
NO-FAULT DIVORCE LEGISLATION 
AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE DIVORCE RATES
INTRODUCTION
The study of divorce relates to broader issues of system stability 
and social control. The family in America has been viewed historically 
as the backbone (Andrew, 1978) or foundation (0*Neill, 1967) of society. 
As modern society becomes increasingly interdependent the family is un­
dergoing a period of transition (Skolnick, 1973:67) with many of its 
functions, such as education and provision of certain essential goods 
and services, now being performed by extra-familial institution and 
agencies. The focus of the family has shifted toward provision of cru­
cial primary group support for family members (Parsons, in Skolnick, 
1973:113, 431). As structural differentiation continues among and 
within societal institutions the relative importance of each of the in­
stitutions for the smooth functioning of the social system increases. 
Threats to any one of the institutions will have implications for the 
general social order. Although the "family as foundation" argument is 
challenged today, the family continues to be recognized as a basic so­
cietal institution and consequently family stability remains an essen­
tial element of overall system stability.
Today, as in the past, divorce is considered a social problem be­
cause it is perceived to threaten the stability of family life. Both 
formal and informal means of social control are employed to regulate 
the divorce problem and protect the integrity of the family. Divorce 
laws are the formalized means of social control of the problem. Since
2
3no-fault divorce legislation represents a major shift in the traditional 
philosophy regarding the dissolution of marriage and its control, this 
change has been accompanied by considerable controversy. One recurrent 
issue has been the potential effect of the new laws on the steadily ris­
ing rate of divorce.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine empirically this relation­
ship between no-fault divorce legislation and divorce rates in the 
United States to determine the independent impact of the law on the 
state rates. It is recognized that divorce is a complex issue with 
many legal aspects, including matters of child custody, property divi­
sion and maintenance (alimony). Consideration of the impact of no-fault 
legislation on all of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper. 
For this reason the focus of attention is limited to changes in the 
bases for marital dissolution (grounds for divorce) in the new and the 
traditional laws. It is also recognized that marriages can terminate 
through death of one spouse and through annulment as well as by divorce; 
and that marital relations can be severed through desertion and separa­
tion. The focus here, however, is on absolute divorce, and the terms 
marriage termination and dissolution are used synonymously with divorce 
unless otherwise stated.
Chapter one provides an historical perspective of divorce law re­
form in the United States and illustrates why no-fault divorce repre­
sents a significant change in fundamental attitudes toward divorce. 
Chapter two discusses the concept of no-fault as it is applied currently 
and several of the factors relevant to its development. In chapter 
three a conceptual framework based on exchange theory and field theory 
is presented which offers one interpretation of the relationship between
divorce law and divorce behavior. Previous empirical research on trad 
tional and no-fault laws is reported in chapter four. The research de 
sign and methods used in this study are explained in chapter five. 
Chapter six presents and discusses the findings of the empirical anal­
ysis, and implications of the research are discussed, in chapter seven.
CHAPTER ONE 
HISTORY OF DIVORCE REFORM
Church versus State
Divorce reform in America began with the English colonists. As set­
tlers in a new land they brought with them a body of well-established 
divorce procedures as sanctioned and implemented by the Church of England. 
However, separation of Church and State was a fundamental issue for many 
who came to America and was quickly achieved in matters relating to mar­
riage .
In England, as elsewhere in the Western world, marriage had been un­
der complete Church control since the thirteenth century A.D. (Lichten- 
berger, 1931:79). Only ceremonies performed by church officials were 
valid. The bond they created between two persons was considered sacred 
and indissoluble. Divorce was not permitted; consequently there were no 
grounds for marital dissolution. The Church did provide alternatives to 
a failed marriage, however, recognizing the sinful nature of man even 
within the sacred institution of marriage. In certain cases an annulment 
could be obtained which declared the marriage invalid from the outset and 
freed such individuals to marry other persons if they so chose. Impo- 
tency, disparity of worship, defect of consent and consanguinity were 
among causes deemed sufficient to declare a marriage null and void (Lich- 
tenberger, 1931:90). Under other circumstances, many of which later 
formed the basis for legal grounds for absolute divorce (e.g. adultery,
5
6insanity), a form of legal separation known as divorce from bed and 
board (divortium a mensa et thoro) resulted in spouses living separate 
and apart but being unable to marry again because the marital bond be­
tween them remained intact. On rare occasion a very wealthy and influ­
ential individual received a divorce by private act obtainable only from 
Parliament or the King. Records indicate that between 1800 and 1836 
there was an average of three such divorces granted per year (Friedman, 
1973:181). With this exception divorce was unavailable under ecclesi­
astical law. England was, legally speaking, a divorceless society. In 
the absence of legal recourse, desertion and adultery were frequent ac­
companiments of marital breakdown.
This ecclesiastical stronghold was broken from the outset in some 
of the Northern colonies. Ideologically their sentiments ran parallel 
to those expressed by Luther during the Protestant Reformation. De­
claring marriage to be a normal human institution he repudiated "the 
sacramental character of marriage as a priestly invention and the ex­
clusive control of the Church as an unwarranted usurpation" (Lichten- 
berger, 1931:92). Unlike Luther the colonists were successful in trans­
lating their beliefs into action and in some areas authority was trans- 
fered out of the hands of the Church and into secular channels. Civil 
contract theory which dominated attitudes toward marriage and divorce 
prior to the early centuries of the Christian era was once again at the 
forefront in the colonies.
Following the American Revolution and the end to English domination 
most of the states, including those in the South, claimed and exercised 
a legislative prerogative to grant divorce by private act (Rheinstein, 
1972:33). At this point authority had passed out of the hands of the
Church and into the state legislatures. In most cases, however, divorce 
remained available only by private act (special permission) of the gov­
erning body. Gradually the states undertook further reform measures as 
the number of divorces increased and the legislative process came under 
attack as being cumbersome, arbitrary, costly and lacking in procedural 
safeguards (Rheinstein, 1972:34). Based partially on the already oper­
ative New England model, virtually all the states enacted legislation 
granting jurisdiction to the civil courts and enumerating specific al­
lowable grounds for divorce, thus creating a legal matter out of a moral 
issue. One notable exception was the state of South Carolina where the 
introduction of divorce laws was expressly forbidden by the state con­
stitution (Rheinstein, 1972:53). The other states varied in the laxity 
of their laws, from New York where adultery became the sole ground, to 
states having a variety of recognized causes for divorce. These grounds 
continued to change from time to time through legislative reform. With­
in states and across states additional grounds were added, existing 
grounds were deleted, or both.
The Constitutional Amendment
During the 1800s divorce increased sufficiently in this country to 
stimulate growing alarm among those who perceived this trend as a har­
binger of the demise of the family. By the 1890s serious efforts were 
underway to reduce this threat to the stability of family life. It had 
long been accepted that protection of the public good and general wel­
fare required governmental oversight in certain areas, including the 
production, caretaking, socialization and education of children. As 
the divorce rate continued to increase during the nineteenth century
8many moral conservatives began to question whether the state was the 
proper level of government in which to vest the power to regulate di­
vorce. Many of them preferred placing authority in the Federal govern­
ment to insure uniform application of laws throughout the nation. The 
country was faced once again with the issue of jurisdiction and a second 
major reform movement was underway. The goal of these moralists was to 
transfer power from the various state legislatures to the Congress in 
an effort to secure greater control over the divorce laws and thus turn 
back the tide of the rising divorce rate.
Achievement of the goal would first require an amendment to the 
Constitution giving Congress the right to act in matters of divorce. As 
written, the Constitution relinquished authority to the states in all 
matters not expressly reserved to the Congress. Opponents of the amend­
ment argued in favor of statesT rights and the desirability of local 
control in deciding on appropriate divorce legislation. Those in favor 
supported uniformity throughout the country in order to eliminate prob­
lems associated with a mobile population, including migratory divorce 
and certain aspects of common law marriages. In 1926, following three 
decades of reform efforts the following comment was published (reported 
in Lichtenberger, 1931:203-204):
. . . The contract of marriage should be a matter 
of interstate commity and commerce as much as con­
tract for the sale of commodities, or freight 
rates, or the white slave traffic. Citizens of 
the United States when moving from State to State 
take their civil rights with them. A married pair 
should be able to take their civil status in one 
State to any other State, especially when that 
status establishes their position as upright citi­
zens instead of bigamists, or adulterers, and 
clothes their children with legitimacy or illegit­
imacy . . . But this is not true in the United 
States, and a married pair may find themselves
9violators when they leave the situs of their 
marriage and travel to another State which 
does not recognize their marriage, or their 
divorce, or their remarriage.
The Supreme Court had already ruled in Haddock v. Haddock that the Full 
Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution, which might offer protec­
tion in such cases, did not apply in questions of marriage and divorce 
(Lichtenberger, 1931:204). Thus, the only chance for uniformity was an 
amendment.
Much of the debate centered around religio-moral issues and the 
battle was a long one in which both sides faced organizational inade­
quacies and ideological divisiveness. During the period 1884-1947 some 
form of Federal amendment on marriage and divorce laws was introduced 
at every new Congress (Rheinstein, 1972:46). Only one ever reached com­
mittee discussion and none was ever brought to a vote. The attempt to 
pass a Constitutional amendment was generally ineffective and never 
posed a serious threat to state sovereignty. States retained jurisdic­
tion as the proper authority to legislate divorce within their respec­
tive boundaries.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
Efforts to achieve uniformity were not limited to efforts aimed to­
ward passage of a Constitutional amendment. In 1892 the National Con­
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) was estab­
lished. Its purpose was to propose model legislation on different le­
gal matters for consideration by the various states in hopes of obtain­
ing full support for the bills nationally. Ideally each of the states 
would agree with the position taken in the bill and voluntarily adopt
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it, thus producing national uniformity on issues not subject to Federal 
control. Marriage and divorce was one area in which model legislation 
was drafted.
This avenue also failed to lead to the desired uniformity in di­
vorce laws and did not further the goals of the reformers at the turn 
of the century. A total of seven statutes on marriage and divorce were 
drafted by 1916 but only a few of the states had enacted any of them 
(O’Neill, 1967:240). The commissioners eventually turned their atten­
tion to other matters. In this perspective the National Conference of 
Commissioners was not influential in the uniformity reform movement. 
Several decades later, however, it figured largely in the debate of an­
other major reform effort.
In 1970 the NCCUSL passed a Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA). 
Agreement had been a long time coming as the Commissioners and members 
of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association failed to 
agree on the crucial matter of grounds for divorce. Although the Uni­
form Marriage and Divorce Act was a thirty-five page document the ABA 
refused to endorse it largely because of the controversial no-fault pro­
visions for obtaining a divorce. They stated support of no-fault di­
vorce in principle but did not accept the specifics of the Act (Wheeler, 
1974:126). Historically the NCCUSL and its bills received much of their 
prestige from the backing of the ABA so it was anxious to obtain the en­
dorsement to help encourage states to adopt the Act. The UMDA was ul­
timately approved by the NCCUSL and subsequently served as a basis for 
legislation in several states. It did not succeed in being adopted by 
all or even most states but it did come at a crucial time in the
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movement toward no-faul€ divorce and provided a framework for states in­
terested in revising their traditional fault-based laws.
The history of reform continues today as states confront the issue 
of grounds for divorce and respond to recent attempts to remove the con­
cept of fault from the divorce procedure. Attention is presently fo­
cused on reform that is designed to change fundamental attitudes toward 
divorce and divorcing persons. This is a significant and rapidly devel­
oping change and represents for our country a new direction in divorce 
laws.
CHAPTER TWO
THE CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Definition
In 1969 the state of California passed no-fault divorce legislation 
as part of its comprehensive Family Law Act, effectively doing away with 
the divorce process in that state and replacing it with a procedure for 
the dissolution of marriage. The change was more than a matter of se­
mantics. It represented a new concept in marriage termination and set a 
precedent for the adoption of similar legislation by other states. Dur­
ing the decade that followed approximately two-thirds of the state leg­
islatures enacted some form of the new no-fault divorce law (see Appen- 
dix A). Fifteen states followed California's lead and abolished exist­
ing grounds for divorce and substituted a single no-fault provision. 
Another fifteen states added a no-fault provision to their existing 
grounds. Other states maintained that existing grounds for divorce, 
such as separation and incompatibility, already provided similar options 
and they declined to add the no-fault procedure. Only three states re­
main where it is not possible to end a marriage without first proving 
that one's spouse is guilty of marital misconduct. Reform efforts con­
tinue in states which have not adopted no-fault divorce procedures and 
the trend is in the direction favorable to proponents of the new laws.
No-fault divorce laws provide for the dissolution of a marriage 
upon a finding by the court that the marriage has broken down to the
12
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extent that any reconciliation is unlikely. The premise of fault is 
eliminated. It is not necessary to show evidence of marital misconduct. 
The focus of the inquiry is the condition of the marriage relationship 
rather than the acts and characteristics of the partners involved (Ham­
ilton, 1978:7). Either spouse may file for dissolution using the neu­
tral format "In re the marriage of John and Mary Doe" rather than the 
familiar "John Doe versus Mary Doe." If it is determined that the mar­
riage is not viable, regardless of reason, it is dissolved. Generally 
the courts accept as conclusive evidence of marital breakdown the state­
ment of one or both of the spouses that the marriage has failed. In 
some states counseling and/or an interim period before actual dissolu­
tion may be required or may be recommended at the discretion of the 
court. The no-fault divorce procedure is a dramatic change from the 
traditional adversary approach in which an "innocent" spouse is granted 
a divorce from the "guilty" spouse upon proof of marital wrongdoing.
Prior to the no-fault laws mutual desire and consent were not legiti­
mate grounds for divorce (Kirkpatrick, 1955:539).
The definition of no-fault divorce is not clear-cut and there is 
some discrepancy in the use of the term. Clearly the recent reform leg­
islation designed specifically to be fault-free in nature is included in 
this category. A review of the state statutes by Harper Hamilton in­
cluded the following legal terminology for conditions existing in the 
marital relationship which are considered bases for no-fault divorce in 
the various states: (1) irreconcilable differences, (2) upon finding
that the marriage relationship is no longer viable, (3) irremedial 
breakdown, and (4) unsupportable because of discord or conflict of per­
sonalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marriage relationship
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and prevents a reasonable expectation of reconciliation (Hamilton, 1978: 
5). These phrases are used interchangeably in discussion and all refer 
to sufficient cause for divorce according to the recently developed no­
fault concept. Two other grounds for divorce are also considered to be 
fault-free by many researchers and other individuals. They are incom­
patibility and separation, but there are certain aspects about these two 
grounds which lead others to exclude them from the no-fault group.
The first incompatibility statutes were adopted a century ago (Sell, 
1979:297). They were later replaced by similar statutes which, through 
court interpretation, were declared to be fault-free in theory. How­
ever, the problem of implementation remained. Incompatibility was asso­
ciated with the traditional fault system and tended to be regarded in 
that perspective (Sell, 1979:298; Wheeler, 1974:38; Wright and Stetson, 
1978:576). It exists as a ground for divorce along with other fault
grounds in New Mexico (adopted in 1933), Alaska (1935), Oklahoma (1953)
*
and Kansas (1969) (Sell, 1979:298). Wheeler states, "For the most part 
courts [in New Mexico, Alaska and Oklahoma] have interpreted the term 
strictly, refusing divorce where a husband and wife simply do not get 
along with each other and have required that incompatibility be proven 
with evidence which could just as well support a finding of cruelty." 
(Wheeler, 1974:38). Although technically not based on fault these in­
compatibility statutes in practice do not reflect the spirit of recent 
reform and are therefore excluded from the no-fault category in this 
discussion.
Separation as a ground for divorce raises related questions. It 
has also been on the books in numerous states for many years and sev­
eral changes have occurred since the first statutes were passed as
15
early as 1839 (Sell, 197*9:299). The trend has been toward reducing the 
number of years of separation required before it may be used as grounds 
for divorce. Periods of ten, seven or five years are changed, sometimes 
in several stages, to shorter periods of five, three or one years. Re­
search by Sell indicates that the length of separation required by a 
state is a factor in the extent to which separation is used as a ground 
for divorce (Sell, 1979:300). In general, the shorter the separation 
period the greater the likelihood separation will be used. Statistical 
evidence leads Sell to conclude that the one year mark is a dividing 
line in the "use" pattern of separation (Sell, 1979:300). Currently 
there are twelve states which have separation grounds as the only alter­
native to traditional fault grounds. (Eight others have separation in 
addition to both fault and no-fault grounds.) Six of the states require 
a period greater than one year, ranging from eighteen months in New Jer­
sey to three years in Arkansas, Utah and South Carolina. The remaining 
six states require a period of one year, with Vermont requiring only 
six months separation. All but one in the latter group of states short­
ened the length of time required by existing statutes sometime after 
1970. The one exception, North Carolina, had a one year requirement as 
early as 1965. The other states either have not shortened the separa­
tion time in recent years or have added separation as a new statute but 
require a separation longer than one year. Based on these facts and 
time factors those six states having separation of one year or less as 
grounds for divorce are included in the no-fault category for the pur­
poses of this research. These statutes offer the opportunity to dis­
solve a marriage without fault-finding procedures and without prolonged 
periods of waiting before the legal rights of divorce and remarriage
16
may be exercised. In this manner they "act like" the no-fault laws 
based on breakdown and not like their sister statutes in other states. 
The six remaining states are not considered no-fault states.
The issue of what constitutes no-fault divorce is not easily re­
solved. Researchers disagree. Authors disagree. Zuckman (1975) has 
recommended separate terminology to distinguish the laws; He suggests 
that "no-fault" be reserved for the "particular scheme of recent legis­
lation in a handful of states which completely eliminates all fault 
grounds from collateral proceedings of alimony, child support, property 
division, and to a large extent, child custody." The term "non-fault" 
would apply to divorce under "any existing legislation which provides 
at least one ground for divorce which doesn’t require showing a marital 
misconduct on the part of the respondent spouse." (Zuckman, 1975:6). 
Whatever the terminology it is important to understand that there are 
differences in the no-fault laws from state to state and that the defi- 
nition of no-fault and fault divorce may vary from situation to situa­
tion.
Other labels have been applied to no-fault divorce reflecting the 
way in which the laws work. The labels include "no-grounds divorce" 
(Wheeler, 1974), "divorce on demand" (Andrew, 1978), and "unilateral 
divorce" (Krause, 1977). They are applied because legal options often 
available to the court in its decision-making process, such as investi­
gations into the state of the marriage, mandatory counseling, and/or 
family court services, are rarely undertaken even where permissible. 
Glendon notes that these are largely matters of formality and ritual, 
originally included in the no-fault legislation to insure passage, and 
later frequently repealed. She describes the process this way: "But
17
now the principle of breakdown has been accepted, the palliatives of in­
quest or conciliation necessary to secure passage of no-fault legisla­
tion can be seen to be dropping away through repeal or disuse." (Glendon, 
1977:235). At the same time fault-based defenses against divorce such as 
recrimination, connivance, and condonation have been limited so that they 
are both inappropriate and inadmissible in fault-free dissolution pro­
ceedings. This leaves the door wide open to "divorce on demand". One 
spouse can terminate his/her marriage at will with the statement that it 
has broken down irretrievably.
The situation is the same under most separation statutes. It is 
necessary only to demonstrate proof of separation for the requisite 
amount of time and divorce is granted. Wheeler suggests that this may 
be a more radical notion than breakdown statutes because it enables an 
individual to dissolve his or her marriage without even a pro forma in­
vestigation by the court (Wheeler, 1974:49). Krause, in an historical 
perspective, suggests that we have passed from restrictive divorce 
through consent divorce (long available through collusion) to unilateral 
divorce (Krause, 1977:274). After several years on the books it is ap­
parent that for all practical purposes no-fault divorce provides in 
fact, if not in form, divorce on unilateral demand.
The application of these terms is interesting in view of the fact 
that technically the new laws place more authority than ever in the 
hands of the judge to deny a divorce request (Glendon, 1977:230). Under 
the fault system divorce had to be granted if the grounds were proved. 
Under no-fault laws a judge could conceivably determine that the mar­
riage is not in fact irretrievably broken or that the differences are 
reconcilable. Although such action is unlikely it would be within the
18
letter of the law. The ambiguity of the wording in no-fault statutes 
is frequently attacked for this reason. According to Glendon one excep­
tion is the state of Washington where the Marriage Dissolution Act of 
1973 states that the court must dissolve marriages if both parties al­
lege that the marriage is irretrievably broken or if no denial is en­
tered by one party to such allegation by the other. Colorado is the only 
other state where divorce must be granted if a petition for divorce is 
unchallenged.
Factors Related to Its Inception
Divorce law reform during the 1970s was in large part a response to
alarm over the steadily rising rate of divorce. Although the general
trend in the national divorce rate has been upward since statistics were
first collected in 1867, there have been occasional periods of dramatic
increase. The post-World War II years were one such period. In 1946
0
the divorce rate hit a record high of 4.3 divorces per thousand popula­
tion (Scanzoni and Scanzoni, 1976:457). The rate subsequently fell and 
leveled off at 2.1-2.3 for a number of years. In 1963 it began another 
upward climb which by 1975 had brought the rate up to 4.9 (Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 1979:84). During that time the rate in­
creased annually, with only two exceptions in 1965 and 1966 (Vital Sta­
tistics of the United States, 1965, 1970, 1974:2-6). Within a period 
of twelve years the divorce rate more than doubled and reached its high­
est level at that point in the nationTs history (see Figure 1, page 19).
Legislative reform was seen as one potential means of dealing with 
the problem of this growing incidence of divorce. Divorce laws as a 
mechanism of social control are intended to support the goal of stability
Figure 1. United States"Crude Divorce Rate, 1920-1978
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Source: United States, Bureau of the Census (1975, 1979) and United
States, National Center for Health Statistics (1978).
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in marriage and family life. When the goal was not being achieved, as 
evidenced in higher divorce rates, the argument was made for changing 
the laws. Lichtenberger labels this approach the legalistic habit of 
mind, refering to the ”. . . almost universal reliance upon law to cre­
ate or maintain the approved standards . . ." (Lichtenberger, 1931:162). 
He notes it has been employed at other times in our history when increas­
ing divorce rates led to passage of more stringent marriage and divorce
laws. During the 1960s and 1970s there was support in general for change 
but disagreement as to what changes should be made as demonstrated in the 
variety of new laws which emerged. In many aspects it appeared to be a 
no-win situation. Borrowing from Bohannon’s list of divorce-related 
"trite homilies" the dilemma finds expression: easy divorce may lead to
casual marriage and the demise of the family; difficult divorce may lead 
to unhappy and destructive marriages and the demise of the family (Bohan­
non, 1979:318, emphasis added).
At the same time legislation was recognized as one factor possibly 
contributing to the problem of the growing incidence of divorce. After 
studying California’s experience With non-adversary divorce three re­
searchers noted:
From time to time some of those persons who deal 
with social problems tend to look upon legisla­
tion as the ultimate tool for social reform ....
Reality is seldom so comforting. More often 
than not, the laws are part of the problem rather 
than part of the solution, a mirror of social 
confusions and hypocrises. (Schoen, Greenblatt,
Mielke, 1975:234)
Arnold Rose (1968) has studied the relationship between law and the
causation of social problems and has identified eleven ways in which
law helps to cause social problems. Two of these are of particular
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interest to the study of divorce and divorce law: (1) a social value
was enacted into statute, or it entered into common law, at an earlier 
period, and is inappropriate to current expectations for behavior; and 
(2) it encourages certain collusions and perjuries to "get around the 
law," which are themselves illegal and encourage disrespect for the law 
(Rose, 1968, 42-43). The relevance of these processes to the develop­
ment and application of no-fault divorce law is discussed in greater 
detail below.
The increasing divorce rate, then, contributed to the focus on di­
vorce laws in recent years. It also underscored potential problems in­
herent in the laws themselves. The states reacted to this in a variety 
of ways. Most chose to reform their divorce laws and some chose to 
abolish the old system completely and begin again with new laws.
No-fault divorce legislation was designed in part to correct for 
perceived shortcomings in the existing laws. Two areas of particular 
concern were the issues of personal trauma and of system abuse. Advo­
cates argue that the trauma associated with divorce is substantially 
lessened by eliminating the need to provide proof of marital wrongdoing 
as part of the dissolution process. The actions of the individuals in­
volved are not subject to public scrutiny. One spouse is not blamed 
for the marriage breakdown while the other is exonerated. The intention 
is to provide an efficient, truthful and more dignified avenue for mar­
riage termination. By replacing traditional attitudes of punishment and 
guilt associated with divorce and divorcing persons with neutral consid­
erations and concern for both spouses, the likelihood of personal bit­
terness is lessened. The threat of divorce or the refusal to sue for 
divorce cannot be used by one spouse against another in bargaining for
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child custody and other settlement issues since either spouse has access 
to the court. The less hostile and more civilized atmosphere, as envi­
sioned by those who drafted and supported the bills, is also beneficial 
to children caught in the divorce process. It should be noted, however, 
that in matters of child custody, as in alimony and property division 
decisions, the issue of fault is still alive. Evidence of misconduct is 
admissible in most states in cases where an out-of-court agreement has 
not been reached and fault may form the basis for a judgment by the 
court regarding these corollary issues (Sell, 1979:296-297).
Problems associated with abuse of the traditional divorce process 
are widespread and well-known. The fault system is attacked as being 
hypocritical on the grounds that it not only tolerates perjury and col­
lusion but actually encourages such actions (Wheeler, 1974:8). Couples 
who do not have legally acceptable grounds for divorce but who wish to 
terminate their marriage frequently fabricate evidence and perjure them­
selves in court. Such action is commonplace and Wheeler states that 
most people in the legal profession accept as axiomatic the notion that 
perjury is the rule in divorce courts (Wheeler, 1974:5). The fact that 
everyone is involved, including the couples and their lawyers and the 
judges, results in a sham in the courtroom and contributes to disrespect 
for the legal process. Timothy Walker discusses this behavior as an ex­
ample of law accommodation, a pattern of normative deviation that occurs 
when there is a breakdown in the ability of a law or rule to command ad­
herence on the basis of its own utility (Walker, 1971:267-268). The re­
sult is behavior "that operates within the established procedures of a 
legal system in order to attain the goal provided by the system." The 
system is accommodated but the procedures are compromised in order to
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achieve acceptable results. This compromise has been recognized by oth­
ers including Max Rheinstein (1972) in his analysis of the "dual law of 
divorce." The dichotomy between the law on the books and the law in ac­
tion is a familiar one and is indicative of the compromise nature of 
many of our laws. Conservatives are satisfied with the strict nature of 
the letter of the divorce law while others adopt a policy of nonenforce­
ment to bring the law into line with social reality (Rheinstein, 1972: 
254). There is still a price to be paid (e.g. perjury) but it is pos­
sible to circumvent the law. Increasing and flagrant abuse of the 
existing fault system was one of the major factors in no-fault reform 
efforts.
Proponents for change also argue that the adversary approach is in­
appropriate for divorce proceedings since ninety percent of all fault- 
based divorce cases are uncontested (Sell, 1979:292; Foster, 1969:113; 
Wheeler, 1974:4). From this view the fault system further complicates 
the issue by requiring couples and lawyers to mold the reason for desir­
ing a divorce into one of the legal grounds for divorce recognized by 
law. For example, evidence indicates that at least seventy-five percent 
of divorces in fault states are based on the ground of cruelty (Wheeler, 
1974:4). Other grounds, more difficult to prove and easier to contest 
in the absence of legitimate evidence, are less likely to be utilized.
There are other objections to the traditional system less fre­
quently cited in the literature, which also played a part in the move­
ment toward no-fault divorce legislation. The ones discussed above 
were perhaps the most pressing in the minds of the reformers. They 
were clearly identified in the Commissioners1 Prefatory Note of 1971 to 
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act:
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The traditional conception based on fault has 
been singled out particulary, both as an inef­
fective barrier to marriage dissolution which 
is regularly overcome by perjury, thus promot­
ing disrespect for the law and its process, 
and as an unfortunate device which adds to the 
bitterness and hostility of divorce proceed­
ings. (quoted in Kargman, 1973:246)
Although no-fault divorce addresses many of the problems associated 
with current laws there remains opposition to a wholesale change in the 
adversary system. Some favor reform without endorsing no-fault di­
vorce. Opposition centers on the statutes themselves and on their po­
tential impact.
Concern over the wording and definition of no-fault statutes ham­
pers reform efforts. Phrases such as "irreconcilable differences" and 
"irremedial breakdown” are attacked as ambiguous. If taken literally, 
no divorce would result since conceivably there might always be some 
small possibility of eventual reconciliation (Wheeler, 1974:21). Beyond 
a few written statements intended to clarify the meaning, the court has 
great discretion in applying the law. The fact that few cases have 
arisen involving a challenge to the meaning of the statutes does not 
preclude continued opposition to this aspect of the law.
Safeguards appear minimal to many conservatives. The phrases "di­
vorce on demand" and "unilateral divorce" cause alarm among such oppo­
nents of the no-fault laws. They argue that such a system violates the 
state’s interest in preserving stable marriages since procedurally no 
efforts are undertaken to verify breakdown or encourage reconciliation. 
The fact that there is no defense available to an unwilling partner in 
the dissolution process is another point cited. Inherent in those con­
siderations is a fear that there will be a rush to dissolve a potentially
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viable marriage prematurely, accompanied by an increase in the termina­
tion of intact but threatened marriages. It parallels the "open door" 
argument discussed by Kirkpatrick (1955), e.g.: where divorce is easily
available, divorce traffic will increase. Opponents are concerned that 
the new laws will only increase the divorce rate.
In general the advent of no-fault divorce has been characterized as 
an example of the law catching up with reality. Concepts of marriage 
and family life and the mores governing such relationships have changed 
and continue to change dramatically during this century. Changing sex 
roles, greater geographic and social mobility, (especially for women), 
emphasis on personal freedom and individualism, increasing economic in­
dependence of family members, and the influence of pragmatism on atti­
tudes toward the permanence of marriage are some of the factors contrib­
uting to the more fluid and pragmatic nature of marriage and the family. 
Prior to recent reform efforts marriage and divorce legislation did not 
correspond with the realities of contemporary marriage, thus the need 
for law accommodation. They were reflective of a time when lasting mar­
riages were highly valued and restrictive divorce measures were insti­
tuted to punish those who desired to break up a marriage for any reason. 
As more opportunities open up outside the marriage relationship, its 
permanence becomes increasingly less attractive to some individuals and 7 
the security it once provided becomes less crucial. The result was a 
noticeable culture lag in which family law had failed to respond to the 
needs of the modern family (Lichtenberger, 1931:6, 259; Bohannon, 1979: 
319; Dean and Kargman, 1966:273). No-fault divorce represents an ef­
fort to remedy the lag and bring the legal and social realities of di­
vorce into alignment.
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Despite the fundamental legal and ideological changes incorporated 
in no-fault divorce it has been surprisingly well received (Wheeler, 
1974:30). A diversity of states with a wide range of social and polit­
ical characteristics have accepted the concept partially or _in toto and 
have functioning no-fault legislation in place today. Wheeler notes 
that the diversity of states with no-fault indicates that the success 
or failure of reform efforts in each state depends in large part on the 
potential skill and energy of the people behind it (Wheeler, 1974:153). 
For this reason special interest groups may significantly influence a 
decision in their favor in one state while exerting little or no pres­
sure on legislators in another state. In California, for example, the 
Catholic Church did not object to passage of the Family Law Act while 
similar legislation has been hampered in other states by opposition 
from the Catholic leaders and lay persons. In some states, including 
California, no-fault laws have passed on the first attempt. In other 
states, Idaho, for example, repeated efforts have failed to pass reform 
measures. These examples illustrate that the experience of each state 
will be different from that of other states. Trend analysis does sug­
gest that eventually each state will have some form of no-fault divorce 
on its books and in action.^
It is noted here that after this study was completed the re­
searcher learned that Pennsylvania has amended its divorce law, adding 
irretrievable breakdown to its existing fault grounds (Purdon’s Penn­
sylvania Legislative Service, 1980:51). This change, because it is so 
recent, would not alter the findings of this study. It is particularly 
significant, however, since Pennsylvania was one of the three states 
which had not recognized the principle of no-fault divorce, even by its 
most liberal definition, in its laws. The new law became effective 
July, 1980.
CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The impact of no-fault divorce legislation on divorce rates can be 
more fully understood in the broader context of the relationship between 
divorce law and family stability, utilizing divorce rates as a measure 
of family stability. Two theoretical models provide a means for study­
ing the relationship between laws and stability. These models are ex­
change theory and field theory, the relevance of both to the study of 
divorce having been established in previous research (Lewis and Spanier, 
1979; Scanzoni, 1972; Levinger, 1965; Kuo, 1974). Lewis and Spanier 
(1979:285) note that the key concepts of attractions and barriers used 
in field theory are compatible with exchange theory. This basic com­
patibility enables one to draw from both bodies of literature, which 
will be done here.
In the exchange model divorce behavior is understood in terms of 
an individual's assessment of the rewards and satisfactions of the mar­
riage relationship in comparison to its associated costs and the poten­
tial for rewards in alternative circumstances. Field theory focuses on 
the attractions to the marriage relationship and the barriers against 
its breakdown. Costs and rewards (barriers and attractions) exist both 
within the marriage relationship and externally to it. There are both 
costs to remaining in the marital dyad and costs to leaving the dyad. 
Similarly, it is posited that there are rewards gained from marriage
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and rewards to be gained by terminating marriage. The decision to ob­
tain a divorce is the result of consideration of each of these four 
types of forces which act upon the individual and the relative strengths 
of these forces. These models are particularly appropriate for this 
study because they clearly acknowledge the extradyadic factors which 
operate in the divorce process as well as the intradyadic factors. Be­
havioral tendency cannot be predicted by knowledge of the individual 
alone because each behavior requires a facilitating environment (Yinger, 
in Kuo, 1974:77). It is necessary to account for the entire field, or 
social matrix, in understanding divorce behavior and factors affecting 
family stability.
Divorce laws are a part of the external environment and thus influ­
ence family stability, presumably by increasing the cost of divorce.
The laws have been labeled variously as a source of barrier strength
(Levinger, 1965), as a restraining force against divorce (Kuo, 1974),
*
and as a threshold variable which mediates between marriage and separa­
tion (Lewis and Spanier, 1979). Because they are a conservative soci­
etal control designed to protect viable marriages, they stand between 
an individual and his or her desire to terminate the marriage. That 
is, it is not possible to avoid the law if one wishes a divorce.
The extent to which the law acts as a barrier will presumably de­
pend on its relative importance for the individual in the cost-benefit 
analysis and on its own strength as a barrier. That is, restrictive 
laws exert a greater restraining force than more lax laws because they 
make divorce more difficult to obtain. No-fault divorce legislation, 
generally assumed to be a liberalization of divorce laws, should de­
crease the strength of this barrier to divorce: this in turn should
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lower the overall cost q£ leaving and increase the likelihood of divorce 
behavior.
The dynamics of the relationship between divorce law and divorce 
behavior can be demonstrated graphically using an exchange typology de­
veloped by Lewis and Spanier (1979).
Figure 2. An Exchange Typology of Marital Quality and Marital Stability
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This typology is the result of their extensive theory construction ef­
forts to relate marital quality to marital stability. In the diagram 
the horizontal axis is the quality axis and represents the interper­
sonal aspects of the marriage/divorce decision. The vertical axis is 
the stability axis, accounting for those environmental or broader soci­
etal level factors present in decision-making. Marital stability was 
defined by the researchers simply as the formal or informal status of a 
marriage as intact or nonintact. The position of a marital dyad on the 
grid depends on the relative strengths of the four vectors. Specific 
couples change position over time as forces in the psychological and 
sociological environment change. Any change which drops the position 
below the horizontal axis increases the likelihood of separation and 
divorce. Passage of no-fault divorce legislation reduces the overall 
pressure to remain married by decreasing the strength of external pres­
sures, vector D. The result is a downward shift on the vertical axis.
♦
For some number of couples this means a move into the low stability 
quadrants and greater potential for divorce. Areas not experiencing 
the legal change would not be subject to that decrease in pressure and 
couples would be stable on the extradyadic axis. All else being equal 
no increase in divorce rate would be expected in those areas.
A similar argument can be made using Kuo's (1974) field theory 
analysis. He states that a divorce decision is made if and when the 
individual perceives that the total driving force toward divorce is 
greater than the restraining force against divorce. This situation is 
expressed in the relational statement: (DI + DD) > (RI + RD) (Kuo,
1974:15-16) where:
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DI = driving* forces away from marital integra­
tion
DD = driving forces toward divorce 
RI = restraining forces for marital integra­
tion
RD = restraining forces against divorce.
No-fault divorce legislation, by reducing the magnitude of the restrain­
ing force against divorce, decreases the sum of the restraining forces 
and therefore increases the likelihood that driving forces in the direc­
tion of divorce will become relatively more forceful and lead to an in­
crease in the number of marriage terminations.
Figure 3 gives an indication of the types of factors associated 
with the different forces discussed above. The comparison of concepts 
in field theory (Kuo) and the exchange typology (Lewis and Spanier) is 
made by this writer.
Figure 3. Types of Forces Influencing Divorce Behavior and Sample 
Associated Factors
TYPE OF FORCE
Kuo Lewis and Spanier
DI Tensions
DD Alternative attrac­
tions
RI Attractions
RD External pressures
SAMPLE ASSOCIATED FACTORS3
Lack of communication, values 
discrepancy 
Preferred alternative sex 
partner, wife’s opportunity 
for independent income 
Companionship, mutual affec­
tion, sexual gratification 
Legal constraints, proscrip­
tive religion, cultural 
norms
3
From Kuo (1974), Lewis and Spanier (1979) and Levinger (1965).
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It seems reasonable to assume that marriages already characterized 
by low quality might be likely to end in divorce in an atmosphere of re­
duced external pressure. However, the typology of Lewis and Spanier 
(1979) and the work of Kuo (1974) suggest that marriages of relatively 
high quality also become subject to divorce. This issue is addressed by 
Lewis and Spanier (1979:288). The researchers note that quadrant II 
marriages (high quality, low stability) are rare, but suggest the plau­
sibility of an increase in the proportion of these marriages in the fu­
ture. They attribute this to the possibility that relatively happily 
married individuals may choose to terminate their marriage in prefer­
ence to even more attractive alternatives. No-fault divorce might 
facilitate such a predisposition on the part of both partners in a 
marriage.
Discussion so far has focused on the effect of no-fault laws on 
intact marriages at the time the law became effective. It has been 
suggested that passage of no-fault divorce laws will increase the di­
vorce rate by reducing the salience of one of the social obstacles to 
divorce. It is further suggested that the presence of no-fault divorce 
is conducive to higher divorce rates because the law continues to act 
in a barrier-reduction manner on intact marriages, leaving them more 
open to the possibility of divorce in the future. It also results in a 
lower configuration for external pressures in new marriages which are 
formed after the law has been operative.
It is possible that there may be noticeable short-term effects in 
addition to the more general long-term impact of no-fault divorce.
This would happen in a situation where many couples were already vacil­
lating between maintenance of their marriage and terminating it.
Passage of no-fault would act to bring them into a high divorce risk 
configuration. This backlog of marriages would then become unstable 
and produce a sudden sharp rise in the divorce rate. The rate would 
then level off again at a point between the pre-reform and immediate 
post-reform rate. This J-curve effect would be noticeable, for exam­
ple, where a significant proportion of couples desired a divorce but 
were unable or unwilling to prove grounds and follow through with the 
adversary process.
Exchange theory and field theory offer a social-psychological ap­
proach to the study of human behavior with a focus on the individual.
Of necessity the present study focuses on states as the unit of analy­
sis and not the couples or married partners within the state. However, 
there are some measurable characteristics of states which make it pos­
sible to determine the extent to which the environment might be condu­
cive to divorce decisions and thus to divorce behavior. It is recog­
nized that states are composed of heterogenous populations. By using 
state-level data the relative presence or absence of the various fac­
tors studied can be documented and a composite picture for the state 
developed. This shift from micro- to macro-level is not ideal but is 
acceptable for present purposes since changes in divorce law are a 
statewide phenomenon.
In summary, the relationship of divorce laws to marital stability 
and divorce behavior has been examined within the framework of an ex­
change typology developed by Lewis and Spanier (1979). This typology 
is compatible with the concepts of field theory, which is also rele­
vant to the study of divorce. It is suggested that the presence of
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no-fault divorce legislation in a state leads to an increase in the di­
vorce rate of that state.
Numerous other factors also effect the divorce rate. Based on pre­
vious research and the theoretical orientation presented here, the fol­
lowing additional hypotheses are made:
1) State divorce rates vary inversely with the 
state1s
a) percent of population with ethnic af­
filiation
b) percent of population Catholic
c) percent of families with children
present
d) percent of population high school 
graduates
e) per capita income
2) State divorce rates vary directly with the 
state* s
a) migration rate
b) percent in manufacturing of civilian 
labor force
c) percent of population urban
d) percent participation in labor force
by women
e) percent of civilian labor force un­
employed
f) percent of population 18-64 years old
g) crude marriage rate
Approximately half of the factors represented in these hypotheses are 
posited to exert their greatest influence on the extradyadic (vertical) 
axis in the Lewis and Spanier typology. These factors are ethnicity, 
Catholicism, migration, industrialization (manufacturing) and urbaniza­
tion. In general this group of variables influences barrier strengths 
against divorce. Extant empirical analyses demonstrate a clear impact 
on the divorce rate by these variables, and this influence must be ac­
counted for in the present attempt to determine the independent impact 
of the legal variables used here on the divorce rate. Presence of chil­
dren, education, income, unemployment, and labor force participation by
women constitute a second group of variables, identified here largely 
because of their influence on the intradyadic dimension (horizontal 
axis) in the exchange typology. Their influence on divorce rates are 
less clear from the empirical literature but this influence should also 
be recognized and controlled statistically in this study. There are 
undoubtedly additional variables which contribute to changes in divorce 
" rates. It is believed that, within the limits of availability of state- 
level data, the ones included here represent major factors relevant to 
both the personal and the environmental aspects of divorce decisions. 
Further discussion of the hypothesized nature of the relationship of 
each of the variables with state divorce rates, along with comments on 
operationalizations of the variables, are included in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER FOUR
PREVIOUS STUDIES
The relationship between divorce law reform and divorce rates is a 
relatively unexplored area in divorce study. The literature indicates 
that most of the studies related to marital instability as measured by 
divorce rates have dealt largely with socio-economic factors and have 
approached the issue from a micro-level orientation with emphasis on 
the individual. Consideration of law as a variable useful in explain­
ing variation in divorve rates is infrequent, as is macro-level analy­
sis with a focus on states as the unit of study.
Early research efforts focused on grounds for divorce as an indi­
cator of divorce law. 'As early as 1891 Willcox documented the lack of 
any clear relationship between either the number of grounds for divorce 
in a state, or a change in that number, and the state divorce rate 
(Lichtenberger, 1931; O’Neill, 1967; Rheinstein, 1972). Subsequent 
studies (Lichtenberger, 1931:181-186; Kirkpatrick, reported in Stetson 
and Wright, 1975:541) revealed a similar lack of relationship. In the 
fault-based system there was little empirically-supported reason to 
expect that legislative changes in the grounds for divorce would re­
sult in changes in divorce rates. This is in line with Willcox’s over­
all conclusion, that " . . .  the immediate, direct and measurable influ­
ence of legislation is subsidiary, unimportant, almost imperceptible” 
(in Lichtenberger, 1931:185-186).
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In the mid-1970s a^report was published by Stetson and Wright (1975) 
which was significant for at least three reasons. It recognized the need 
to incorporate legal variables along with the familiar nonlegal variables 
in a study of divorce rates. It also employed a more sophisticated mea­
sure for the divorce law variable, although noting measurement difficul­
ties as a possible weakness in the study. Finally, the report produced 
findings contrary to those of previous research.
The Stetson and Wright (1975) research indicates that divorce pol­
icy per se does have an independent effect on state divorce rates.
Using a regression model with states as units of analysis, Stetson and 
Wright examined the relationship between state divorce rates for the 
year 1960 and three groups of independent variables. Each of the three 
groups, economic development, social costs of divorce, and divorce pol­
icy permissiveness, had multiple indicators. There were two measures 
of divorce policy permissiveness. The statute law index reflected the 
number of grounds available for divorce. The implementation index, de­
veloped by Broel-Plateris, reflected the permissiveness of actual im­
plementation of the statutes by the courts. The partial correlation 
coefficients for the law index and implementation index, controlling 
for all other independent variables, were .47 and .61 respectively.
These were higher than comparable coefficients for any of the other 
variables. From their study Stetson and Wright drew three major con­
clusions: (1) a strong relationship exists between permissiveness of
divorce laws and divorce rates; (2) the relationship remains when ef­
fects of variations in economic development and social costs are con­
trolled; and (3) the effect of economic and social processes on divorce 
rates are substantially reduced when permissiveness of law and
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implementation are controlled. Based on the data they suggest that per­
missiveness of state divorce laws is a major determinant of state di­
vorce rates. This is the only study encountered by this reviewer which 
shows some aspect of the divorce law to be a factor in state divorce 
rates.
Applicability of the Stetson and Wright research to current studies 
of divorce laws and rates is limited by the operationalization of the 
divorce policy variables. The law index for each state is based on the 
presence or absence of five specific grounds for divorce. Because the 
new divorce laws eliminate grounds for divorce this is not an appropri­
ate index for prediction in no-fault states. The implementation index 
raises serious methodological questions. It is based on responses from 
a panel of sixty-eight "experts in family law" throughout the United 
States (Stetson and Wright, 1975:541). In the absence of better mea­
sures it is an important step toward accounting for variation in imple­
mentation of the law. However, the scale was developed in 1959 and it 
is unclear what changes would result if new surveys were administered. 
Efforts to apply comparable indices appropriate for use in no-fault and 
fault states have not been reported. The concept of implementation is 
likely to remain an important factor, methodologically accounting for 
the difference between the "law on the books" (statute law) and the 
"law in action" (implementation) discussed by Rheinstein (1972) and 
others.
Three studies deal specifically with the impact of no-fault di­
vorce legislation on divorce rates. This is not surprising in view of 
the historical pattern of oversight concerning the effect of the laws 
and also the recent emergence of the no-fault concept in state policy.
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Each of the studies tested the hypothesis that the presence of no-fault 
divorce laws in a state leads to an increase in that state*s divorce
rate. None was able to support the hypothesis.
Wright and Stetson (1978) also conducted an empirical study to de­
termine whether the introduction of marital breakdown as a basis for di­
vorce has contributed to increases in divorce in the United States. The 
study covered the years 1960-1974. The researchers first determined 
which states adopted no-fault laws and which did not during that time.
It is noted that they used a strict definition of no-fault, excluding 
states with separation and incompatibility grounds as not representative 
of the principle of marital breakdown evidenced in the new laws. State 
divorce rates for the reform group were adjusted, using the mean rate 
for no-reform states, to account for annual changes that presumably 
would have occurred as a result of normal increase. Results indicate 
little support for the hypothesis that breakdown provisions lead to an 
increase in divorce rates (Wright and Stetson, 1978:578). This finding 
held up under additional rate adjustments to correct for any linear 
trend that might be influencing the data.
Wright and Stetson (1978) approached their research with the con­
cept of no-fault divorce as a liberalizing measure, which is the view 
generally expressed in the literature. Since the data reveal no impact 
of the new laws on the state divorce rates they question the assumption 
that the laws actually make the divorce process more permissive. This 
follows from their finding in 1975 that measures of permissiveness of 
divorce laws are strongly related to divorce in the various states.
They note the influence of other issues also regulated by divorce law 
(e.g. residency requirements, custody) and the difference in the laws
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from state to state as possible factors which prevent breakdown provi­
sions from exerting a permissive influence on the divorce process.
Research by Mazur-Hart and Berman (1977) provides additional evi­
dence that divorce rates are not significantly influenced by the passage 
of no-fault divorce legislation. Their study, based, on the state of 
Nebraska, used an interrupted time-series quasiexperimental design with 
separate analysis for four control variables. While the frequencies of 
divorce in Nebraska increased systematically during the time studied, 
the increase appeared to be totally unrelated to the no-fault legisla­
tion (Mazur-Hart and Berman, 1977:309). Two variables, length of mar­
riage and age at divorce, showed short-term effects. Long-term effects 
were revealed for the race variable, which was used in this study as an 
indicator for socio-economic status. Divorce'levels among blacks in­
creased following the inception of no-fault divorce. The authors pos­
tulate that no-fault divorce has helped to relieve the financial burden 
of divorce in Nebraska and therefore has contributed to an increase in 
the number of divorces among lower income families.
A third study of no-fault divorce law reform and increasing divorce
rates is that of Kenneth Sell (1979). The most recent of the studies
reported here, Sell uses a four-way classification of all states for the
2
period 1968-1976. By his categorization incompatibility and separation 
statutes are defined as no-fault in addition to the recent breakdown
The states are grouped by type of divorce law as follows: (1) no­
fault grounds only; (2) fault grounds only; (3) mixed: incompatibility
added to fault grounds —  defined so that irreconcilable differences, 
irretrievable breakdown, and incompatibility are used interchangeably; 
and (4) mixed: separation added to fault grounds. Sell notes that five
states have both separation and incompatibility added to fault grounds 
and he lists these states separately.
statutes. Noting that adequate post-change data are not available at 
this time for a time-series Study, Sell limited his analysis to "eye- 
balling” the plotted divorce rates and a comparison of mean rates for 
the change and no-change states. He considers statistical tests inap­
propriate for the data because of the assumptions necessary for these 
tests (Sell, 1979:302). His results indicate that fault-only states had 
the smallest increase in divorce rate during the period studied but that 
this increase did not differ substantially from the increase found in 
each of the other groups of states. Sell concluded that changes in the 
grounds for divorce do not substantially increase the divorce rates in 
the fifty states.
The empirical evidence suggests that changes in divorce laws have 
not contributed significantly in either a positive or-negative direc­
tion to the rate of divorce in the various states.
CHAPTER FIVE
METHODOLOGY
The basic research question addressed in this thesis is: "Does the
presence of no-fault legislation in a state contribute to an increase in 
the divorce rate of that state?" The finding of a positive relationship 
between a measure of the divorce rate and an indicator of divorce law 
would suggest an affirmative answer. States were used as the unit of 
analysis because regulation of divorce law is a matter of state control 
and changes occur at this level. The number of cases is forty-five 
(N=45). Four states, Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, and New Mexico are 
excluded from analysis due to incomplete reporting of basic divorce rate 
measures. Nevada is excluded because of its extreme divorce and mar­
riage rates which are two and nine times higher, respectively, than the 
next highest comparable state rates.
A cross-sectional design with simple correlation and multiple re­
gression analysis was used. Sub-programs in the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) provided data analysis. Raw input data were 
collected for each state from published reports, chiefly those of the 
United States Bureau of the Census (see Appendix B for details). 
Twenty-seven variables were identified. Nine were measures of divorce 
rate, the dependent variable. There were two indicators of divorce law, 
the independent variable. Remaining variables served as independent 
control variables. A complete zero-order correlation matrix was
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generated. From this matrix the strongest predictor variables were cho­
sen for further analysis in stepwise multiple regression equations. In­
clusion criteria for control variables in regression analysis were not 
predetermined.
The crude divorce rate (CDR), the number of divorces per thousand 
population, was used in measuring the dependent variable. One limita­
tion of the CDR is that the population on which it is based includes 
persons not "at risk" in divorce, such as children and older single per­
sons. Data necessary to compute more precise measures, such as the re­
fined divorce rate or standardized rates, were not available by state. 
However, the similarity in long-term trends reflected by both the crude 
rate and the refined rate suggest the basic validity of the CDR (Scan- 
zoni, 1972:8).
Four divorce rate variables were identified initially: DIVORCE1, 
the 1960 CDR; DIVORCE2, the 1978 CDR; RATECHNG, the amount of change in 
CDR 1960-1978; and QRTILE, the quartile ranking by 1978 CDR. Changes 
in the divorce rates for the period 1960-1970 were included to account 
for any pre-reform trends evidenced in the state rates which may have 
continued on into the 1970s. Changes in rates beginning in 1970 and 
continuing through 1978 would reflect any shifts brought about by leg­
islative reform. The upper limit is set at 1978 because divorce rates 
for subsequent years are not yet available. The eighteen year period 
also reflects the fact that legislative reform may be a result as well 
as a cause of increasing divorce rates. To examine this possibility 
and to discover if the longer period may have biased the results, sep­
arate analyses of divorce rate measures were obtained for each of the
44
decades. The amount of change in CDR 1960-1970 was labeled CHNG60S. The 
corresponding change for 1970-1978 was labeled CHNG70S.
An index labeled DIVSCORE was created by obtaining the product of 
the values for RATECHNG and QRTILE. In the event that the component 
variables were moderately correlated with each other the divorce score 
index would provide a useful measure for the dependent variable, reflect­
ing both the magnitude of the divorce rate and the amount of change in 
the rate over the period studied. This composite measure would be pref­
erable to the other indicators which could capture only one aspect of 
the divorce rate. A comparable index for the 1970s (SCORE70S) was also 
created.
Definition of the independent variable raises some questions (see
Chapter 2). Some definitions of no-fault divorce are' more inclusive
than others. In this research six groups of states were identified on
the basis of the type of divorce law on the books in the state:
•
1 = Breakdown (no-fault) Only (N=15)
2 = Breakdown plus Fault (N=14)
3 = Separation < 1  year plus Fault (N=6)
4 = Separation > 1 year plus -Fault (N=4)
5 = Incompatibility plus Fault (N=3)
6 = Fault Only (N=3).
This classification was labeled DIVLAW. These six groups were then col­
lapsed into a three-way classification (DIVLAWR):
1 = Breakdown Only (N=15) = 1 above
2 = Mixed (N=20) = 2 and 3 above
3 = Fault Only (N=10) = 4-6 above.
Fifteen independent (control) variables were used in the study.
See Table 1, page 45 for a complete variable list with labels and opera­
tional definition. Below is a brief discussion of the predictor vari­
ables and additional information about their measurement and reason for 
selection.
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Table 1.
Variable
DIVORCE 1
DRATE70
DIVORCE2
CHNG60S
CHNG70S
RATECHNG
QRTILE
DIVSCORE
SCORE70S
NUMGRNDS
DIVLAW
DIVLAWR
RACE
ETHNIC
CATHOLIC 
CHILD18
ONECHILD
Variable List ,and Operational Definitions
Operational Definition
crude divorce rate, 1960
crude divorce rate, 1970
crude divorce rate, 1978
amount of change in CDR, 1960-1970
amount of change in CDR, 1970-1978
amount of change in CDR, 1960-1978
quartile ranking by CDR, 1978 (1 = low, 4 = high)
product of RATECHNG and QRTILE
product of CHNG7QS and QRTILE
total number of grounds for divorce, 1978
categorization by type of divorce law(s), 1978
1 = Breakdown (no-fault) Only
2 = Breakdown plus Fault
3 = Separation < 1 year plus Fault
4 = Separation > 1 year plus Fault
5 - Incompatibility plus Fault
6 = Fault Only
recoded categorization by type of law(s), 1978
1 = Breakdown Only (1 above)
2 = Mixed (2 and 3 above)
3 = Fault Only (4-6 above)
quartile ranking by percent of total population black, 
1976
percent of population with parentage of foreign stock, 
1970
percent of population Catholic, 1979
percent of families with own children under 18 years 
present, 1970
percent of families with one child under 18 years 
present, 1970
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Variable
GE4CHILD
WOMLABOR
UNEMPLOY
INCOME
EDUCATN
INDUST
URBAN
MIGRATN
MGRATE
AGE
Variable List and Operational Definitions 
(continued)
Operational Definition
percent of families with four or more children under 
18 present, 1970
percent participation in labor force by women, 1978 
percent of civilian labor force unemployed, 1978 
per capita, 1975
percent of population high school graduates, 1976
percent in manufacturing of employed civilian labor 
force, 1970
percent of population urban, 1970 
percent net change of population, 1970-1977 
crude marriage rate, 1978
percent of population 18-64 years old, 1978
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Two of the variables might be considered "risk" factors which help 
compensate for inadequacies in the CDR. The proportion of the popula­
tion aged 18-64 is one measure. This age is most at risk in divorce 
decisions. Due to insufficient data it was not possible to break age 
(AGE) down into additional categories. A summary category was accepted. 
Marriage rates (MGRATE) were also obtained on the assumption that more 
marriages means more potential divorces.
Three of the control variables have been identified as social cost 
factors in previous divorce studies (Stetson and Wright, 1975; Fenelon, 
1971). Their impact on divorce rates is well documented. Ethnicity 
(ETHNIC) and Catholicism (CATHOLIC) represent social and religious bar­
riers to marriage termination. High in-group solidarity and social con­
trol act to reinforce traditional norms of fainily stability. The mea­
sure of Catholicism used here is percent of the population Catholic. It 
is based on religious affiliation and does not reflect devoutness, fre­
quency of church attendance or other aspects of religious commitment. 
Other denominations could not be included because of insufficient data. 
However, proscriptions against divorce are strongest in the Catholic 
church and are only now beginning to be relaxed. Fenelon (1971) pro­
vides strong evidence of the importance of migration rates (MIGRATN) in 
explaining divorce rates. In areas where the population is relatively 
mobile social integration is weak and the impact of social norms and 
constraints is reduced.
The processes of urbanization (URBAN) and industrialization (INDUST) 
operate similarly to the migration factor. These variables are indica­
tors of the increasing scale of society as discussed by the social area 
model as it relates to urban development (in Timms, 1971:123-210). As
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societal scale, or modernization, increases, structural changes occur 
within the society which affect the scope of interaction and dependency 
among the members of that society. The three indicators of this process 
used here act indirectly to reduce the social costs of divorce by con­
tributing to a breakup of traditional family patterns and functions.
They also result in lower levels of community integration and its asso­
ciated network of influence.
Less research has been done on the presence of children in a mar­
riage as a source of barrier strength against divorce. Jacobson and 
Monahan (in Levinger, 1965:24) report that childless couples are more 
likely to separate than parental couples, and Renne (in Scanzoni and 
Scanzoni, 1976:376) found that persons currently raising children are 
more likely than those not currently raising children to report marital 
dissatisfaction. While children may increase the cost of remaining in
marriage an obligation to dependent children apparently acts as a bar- 
*
rier to divorce. As societal emphasis on familism gives way to individ­
ualism the strength of that barrier can be expected to fluctuate. Pres­
ence of children might also increase the cost of divorce by complicating 
the divorce process with issues of child custody, visitation rights and 
financial support. There were three indicators for this variable, one 
determining the proportion of the population having children under 
eighteen years of age present (CHILD18) and two others based on the num­
ber of children present (ONECHILD, GE4CHILD). In his economic analysis 
of divorce Becker (1977) identifies children as "marriage-specific" cap­
ital. Their utility or reward value is substantially decreased outside 
of the marriage context. According to this perspective, the more
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children one has the greater the cost of divorce and the greater the re­
ward of marriage.
Several socio-economic factors are important. Income (INCOME) is 
inversely related to divorce rates according to studies which include an 
income measure (see Levinger, 1965:21-23). Higher incomes enable cou­
ples to increase the attractions to marriage by having or doing those 
items and activities which are considered rewarding. The concept of de­
sertion as the "poor man* s divorce" would seem to contradict this and 
suggest that lower income couples would be less likely to divorce due to 
financial constraints. As more couples stay above poverty level the 
economic feasibility of divorce improves. This view of desertion is 
even more questionable today because of the 1971 Supreme Court ruling in 
Boddie v. Connecticut that access to divorce courts cannot be denied due 
to inability of the petitioner to pay for the divorce (Kargman, 1973: 
246; Glendon, 1977:230). Race (RACE) is a factor which is difficult to 
analyze independently because it is so closely associated with income.
It has been measured here by quartile ranking because census data for 
percent of population black includes twelve missing values. Education 
(EDUCATN), like income, is inversely related to divorce rates (Scanzoni 
and Scanzoni, 1976; Scanzoni, 1972; Levinger, 1965) and positively re­
lated to marital quality (Lewis and Spanier, 1979). It is generally 
explained in terms of increased opportunities for rewards and satisfac­
tion in the marriage. The relationship between education and divorce 
is sex-related (Glick, 1975; Scanzoni, 1972:18-19). Scanzoni (1972) 
notes that for both men and women high school graduation contributes to 
marital stability. The indicator for education used here is the per­
cent of the population who are high school graduates. The median number
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of school years completed was an unacceptable measure because the range 
for all states was 0.8 years.
Two variables not generally included in divorce studies are women 
in the labor force (WOMLABOR) and unemployment (UNEMPLOY). The percent 
of women in the labor force is increasing. It is suggested that this 
variable is positively associated with divorce rates. Participation in 
the labor force will reduce to some extent the strength of economic de­
pendency as a barrier to divorce for women while increasing the strength 
of alternative attractions. This factor parallels changes in tradi­
tional sex-based family roles and responsibilities. As this occurs 
there is also the potential for increased marital tension. Unemployment 
affects income, also, and would be expected to indirectly increase di­
vorce rate measures for this reason. It is generally' a short-term fac­
tor. This might be particularly significant in no-fault states because 
relatively little time elapses before divorce is granted. Otherwise the 
tensions caused by temporary unemployment might have abated sufficiently 
to cause an individual or couple to reconsider the divorce decision. To 
the extent that unemployment is considered long-term and/or is viewed as 
a chronic problem it can act to increase marital tensions and the driv­
ing force away from marital integration.
CHAPTER SIX 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Divorce Score and Divorce Law Indices
The zero-order correlation matrix for selected variables is given
o
in Table 3, page 53. Correlation coefficients quoted in the text are 
taken from this matrix. Analysis of the relationship between the com­
ponent variables of the divorce score index showed the rate of change 
in the divorce rate (RATECHNG) and the quartile ranking by divorce rate 
(QRTILE) to be moderately correlated (r = 0.584). This index (DIVSCORE) 
was used as the measure of the dependent variable in subsequent regres­
sion analysis. In order to have a comparable divorce rate measure for 
the period 1970-1978 when no-fault laws were in effect, a second index 
(SCORE70S) was used in limited additional analysis. It is noted that 
the component variables for this index, CHNG70S and QRTILE, were only 
weakly related (r = 0.259).
As expected from previous studies (Lichtenberger, 1931; Kirkpatrick 
in Stetson and Wright, 1975) the number of grounds for divorce in a 
state (NUMGRNDS) showed little or no relationship to any of the divorce 
rate measures (r = -0.014 to -0.109). This variable distinguishes
3Correlation coefficients, means and standard deviations are not 
reported for the decade-specific divorce rate variables which were used 
only in limited additional analysis. Statistical information for these 
variables (SCORE70S, CHNG60S, CHNG70S, DRATE70S) is available by request 
from the author.
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
DIVORCE1 2.253 1.110
DIV0RCE2 5.256 1.487
RATECHNG 2.998 0.741
QRTILE 2.511 1.121
NUMGRNDS 6.489 4.424
DIVLAW 2.444 1.531
DIVLAWR 1.889 0.745
RACE 2.511 1.121
ETHNIC 14.847 9.518
CATHOLIC 19.276 13.128
CHILD 18 56.091 3.156
ONECHILD 17.893 1.175
GE4CHILD 10.431 1 .872
WOMLABOR 50.998 4.420
UNEMPLOY 5.753 1.513
INCOME 4741.178 725.374
EDUCATN 67.593 7.241
INDUST 22.951 9.170
URBAN 65.718 14.931
MIGRATN 9.411 8. 158
MGRATE 10.644 2.581
AGE 70.367 2.164
DIVSCORE 8.002 4.783
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Table 3. Zero-Order Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables
DIVORCE! DIVORCE2 RATECHNG QRTILE NUMGRNDS DIVLAW
DIVORCE1 1 .000
DIVORCE2 .882 1 .000
RATECHNG .255 .681 1 .000
QRTILE .882 .954 .584 1 .000
NUMGRNDS -.070 -.055 -.014 -.088 1 .000
DIVLAW -.191
oCM1 -.115 -.215 .518 1 .000
DIVLAWR -.191 -.179 -.075 -.175 .713 .921
RACE .027 -.038 -.125 .023 .136 .090
ETHNIC -.423 -.371 -.103 , -.378 _ -.081 -.046
CATHOLIC -.538 -.541 -.272 -.558 .077 .046
CHILD!8 .010 .154 .296 .161 -.033 .124
ONECHILD .151 .228 .227 .267 .172 .118
GE4CHILD -.126 -.101 -.011 -.109 -.01 7 .095
WOMLABOR -.128 -.003 .196 -.018 -.208 .050
UNEMPLOY .140 .269 .328 .249 -.021 -.049
INCOME .031 .168 .298 .098 -.177 .143
EDUCATN .063 .167 .252 .152 -.394 -.048
INDUST -.360 -.356
0CO•1 -.320 .337 .076
URBAN .018 -.012 -.048 .043 -.153 -.054
MIGRATN .586 .732 .584 .676 -.130 -.100
MGRATE .533 .507 .214 .511 .116 .176
AGE -.272 -.304 -.200 -.300 ‘ -.155 -.146
DIVSCORE .689 .932 .844 .911 -.109 -.185
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Zero-Order Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables
(continued)
DIVLAWR RACE ETHNIC CATHOLIC CHILD18 ONECHILD
DIVLAWR 1.000
RACE .070 1.000
ETHNIC -.031 -.388 1.000
CATHOLIC .039 -.301 .852 1.000
CHILD18 .174 -.369 .009 -.164 1.000
ONECHILD .199 .545 -.389 -.477 .301 1.000
GE4CHILD .118 -.627 .104 .063 .703 -.356
WOMLABOR -.019 -.248 .134 .113 .525 .062
UNEMPLOY * -.035 .102 .195 .056 .261 .339
INCOME .043 -.124 .398 .253 .416 .136
EDUCATN -.152 -.608 .454 .251 .431 -.399
INDUST .166 .499 .038 .260 -.299 .221
URBAN -.070 .217 .542 .400 -.109 .047
MIGRATN -.096 -.295 -. 195 -.394 .433 .166
MGRATE .226 -.054 -.512 -.588 .235 .233
AGE -.242 .340 .333 .420 -.740 -.136
DIVSCORE -.164 -.086 -.272 -.470 .258 .237
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Zero-Order Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables
(continued)
GE4CHILD WOMLABOR UNEMPLOY INCOME EDUCATN INDUST
GE4CHILD 1 .000
WOMLABOR .307 1 .000
UNEMPLOY -.022 -.057 1 .000
INCOME .062 .472 .502 1 .000
EDUCATN .410 .522 -.023 . 597 1 .000
INDUST -.381 -.200 .085 -.241 -.478 1 .000
URBAN -.311 -.031 .187 .436 .332 .131
MIGRATN .274 .203 .271 .286 .322 -.503
MGRATE .140 .069 -.110 -.215 -.076 -.349
AGE -.742 -.163 -.079 .023 -.126 .347
DIVSCORE i o .117 .330 .267 .280 -.351
URBAN MIGRATN MGRATE AGE DIVSCORE
URBAN 1 .000
MIGRATN -.093 1 .000
MGRATE -.307 .467 1.000
AGE .350 -.534 -.506 1.000
DIVSCORE .022 .750 .428 -.291 1 .000
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clearly between breakdown states (NUMGRNDS = 1 or 2) and states retaining 
fault (4 < NUMGRNDS < 15); however, it does not distinguish adequately 
between fault-only states and mixed states, all of which have multiple 
grounds for divorce. It was eliminated from additional study for these 
reasons.
Output from the multiple regression on DIVSCORE is presented in Ta­
ble 4, page 57. Three variables (RACE, GE4CHILD, URBAN) whose correla­
tion with DIVSCORE was less than 0.10 are excluded, as are variables ex­
plaining less than one percent of the variance in the dependent variable 
(ONECHILD, WOMLABOR, MGRATE, INDUST). Three additional variables (ETH­
NIC, INCOME, CHILD18) were eliminated on the basis of high collinearity 
with other included variables as described below:
ETHNIC with CATHOLIC, r = 0.852 '
INCOME with EDUCATN, r = 0.600 
CHILD18 with AGE, r = -0.740.
Multiple regression analysis reveals that the divorce law index is 
the least important predictor variable in the regression equation (Ta­
ble 4, page 57). A standardized unit increase in the divorce law mea­
sure has virtually no effect on the divorce score index (BETA = 0.072). 
This lack of relationship had been suggested in the correlation analysis. 
It was also apparent in the regression on the 1970s divorce score index 
(BETA = .068, R = .484, not shown) and on the 1970s divorce rate change 
(BETA = .098, R^ = .286, not shown). Despite holding constant the im­
pact of the other variables, indicators of the divorce law and the di­
vorce rate appear to be unrelated. The major hypothesis that the pres­
ence of no-fault divorce leads to an increase in state divorce rates is 
not accepted. Evidence indicates that no-fault laws neither increase
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Table 4. Multiple Regression Analysis on the Divorce Score Index
Standardized 
Regression Coefficient 
(BETA)
MIGRATN .750 .614
CATHOLIC -.470 -.405
AGE -.291 .299
UNEMPLOY .330 .250
EDUCATN .280 .233
DIVLAWR -.164 .072
R2 = 0.710
Variable Zero-Order
Correlation Coefficient 
(r)
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nor decrease the divorce rate. This lack of relationship is demon­
strated graphically by the smoothness of the curve in Figure 4, page 59.
This finding supports previous research on the impact of no-fault 
legislation on divorce rates (Mazur-Hart and Berman, 1977; Wright and 
Stetson, 1978; Sell, 1979). Wright and Stetson (1978) further suggested 
that no-fault divorce legislation is not a permissive law, based on 
their earlier finding (1975) that measures of permissiveness of divorce 
laws are strongly related to state divorce rates. If this suggestion is 
correct then the divorce law index used here (DIVLAWR) represents a nom­
inal level scale because no hierarchy of liberalization exists. On the 
other hand the suggestion is questionable since measures of the permis­
siveness indices used by Stetson and Wright (1975) assume a fault-based 
system. The law index is based on the number of certain specified 
grounds for divorce on the books in a state; but no-fault divorce elim­
inates grounds for divorce. The implementation index is based on the 
comparative laxity with which the statute law is administered; but there 
is reason to suspect that there might be little variation in implementa­
tion of no-fault statutes. Apparently the courts in general do not ex­
ercise the discretion they have in implementing the new laws (see Chap­
ter 2, page 16). At the same time corollary issues of custody, support 
and property division still vary among the states having breakdown stat­
utes. Permissiveness could continue to make substantial differences in 
these aspects of the dissolution laws. Previous discussion using the 
exchange typology assumes that the laws are permissive and therefore 
that they reduce the barrier strength of legal constraints. If they are 
not permissive then the null hypothesis would have been predicted. In 
the absence of permissiveness indicators applicable to both traditional
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Figure 4. United States^Crude Divorce Rate 1960-1978,a With Number of 
States Enacting No-Fault Legislation Per Yearb
N=0N=2
N=3
N=7
5 --
N=3
N=3N=3
N=83 --
N=6
1964 19661962 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978
aUnited States, Bureau of the Census (1975, 1979) and United States, 
National Center for Health Statistics (1978). 
bSell (1979:203).
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laws and no-fault laws there remains a question as to whether no-fault 
laws liberalize the divorce process. Other explanations are needed to 
help understand the lack of relationship between laws and rates.
The conceptual framework introduced in chapter three suggests that 
one alternative explanation relates to public awareness of the laws.
Both field theory and exchange theory are based on the individual*s per­
ception of the total environment and his assessment of the cost-benefit 
ratio in decision-making. Laws must be present in the decision-making 
process in order to influence it. A study of the impact of new laws re­
quires the assumption that individuals are aware of the significance of 
the changes made. Research by Deckert and Langelier (reported in Sell, 
1979:301) indicates that following Canadian divorce law reform forty-two 
percent of the Quebec residents studied were not aware of the changes 
that had been made. Of those who were aware of the changes, ninety-one 
percent reported they were not influenced by the prospect of more lib- 
eral laws. Sell suggests that the situation in the United States would 
probably be similar to that in Quebec, although there is no research 
evidence to support or invalidate that suggestion. Implications from 
Rheinstein (1972) support the assumption. Rheinstein points out that 
compromise between the law on the books and the law in action under the 
fault system was worked out quietly among judges, lawyers and divorcing 
persons (Rheinstein, 1972:254). It was not open to public view because 
of the ethical issues involved in acknowledged perjury and other law 
accommodation procedures. To some extent the change to no-fault divorce 
may have been an extension of this backroom process in which those di­
rectly involved sought a more acceptable solution to the problem. It 
was not possible in this study to measure at the state level the extent
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of publicity about divorce laws or to determine the amount of public 
awareness of legal reform. It is only noted here that any potential im­
pact of laws on divorce rates may be a function of public awareness, and 
that indirect evidence suggests that the awareness is low. In this case 
no-fault laws could not act to reduce the social barrier to divorce, 
which in turn could not increase the likelihood of divorce decisions.
The Deckert and Langelier study (in Sell, 1979) indicates that even 
when awareness is adequate, the influence of reform is not extensive. 
Only ten percent of the Quebec respondents claimed to be influenced, and 
we do not know in what way they were influenced. Any barrier reduction 
accompanying reform appears to be quite slight.
A second alternative explanation for the lack of relationship be­
tween laws and rates involves the direction of causality. No-fault leg­
islation may be a consequent of increasing divorce rates rather than a 
cause of further increase. To check this possibility a multiple regres­
sion analysis was obtained using the divorce law index (DIVLAWR) as the 
dependent variable (Table 5, page 62). Twenty-five percent of the vari­
ance in the law index could be explained by the combined impact of the 
variables. The divorce score measure, used here as an independent vari­
able, had the second largest BETA in the equation, contributing a stan­
dardized decrease of 0.329 of the standard deviation of the law vari­
able. This suggests that divorce rates do influence the divorce laws 
of a state. The negative direction of the relationship indicates that 
states with higher divorce rates are more likely to have lenient (no­
fault) divorce laws.
Consideration of the separate divorce rate variables for the 1960s 
(CHNG60S) and the 1970s (SCORE70S, CHNG70S) provides additional
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Table 5. Multiple Regression Analysis on the Divorce Law Index
Variable Zero-Order 
Correlation Coefficient 
(r)
Standardized 
Regression Coefficient 
(BETA)
AGE -.242 -.256
INDUST .166 .234
MGRATE .226 .330
DIVSCORE -.164 -.329
ONECHILD .199 .175
EDUCATN -.152 .128
R = 0.255
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information. The impact of these variables on the divorce law index is 
less than that revealed by the general divorce score index discussed 
above (Tables 6-8, pages 64-66). However, the results show that among 
the decade-specific variables the greatest influence on the laws is found 
in the amount of change during the 1960s (BETA = -0.220). Furthermore, 
the direction of the impact of the change during the 1970s is positive 
(BETA = 0.108), suggesting that those states with higher amounts of 
change during the 1970s were more likely to be states having restrictive 
laws. The signs and relative strengths of the zero-order correlation co­
efficients for the 1960 and 1970 rate change variables with the divorce 
law index are the same as the BETA coefficients (r = -0.216 and r = 0.158, 
respectively). This information suggests that no-fault legislation, 
where enacted, may tend to suppress the growth in state divorce rates.
The reader is cautioned that in none of the regression equations 
was more than twenty-five percent of the variance in divorce laws poli­
cies explained, and that the divorce rate measures accounted for only a 
small fraction of that percentage. The net. impact on the law index is 
quite small. It must be remembered that although the first no-fault 
laws were enacted in 1970, most were passed in subsequent years. The 
impact of the CHNG70S variable still cannot account for this time dif­
ferential. More sophisticated measurement techniques and the passage 
of more time are needed to clarify this relationship.
Historically, as divorce rates increased over the years there was 
a subsequent but parallel trend toward more restrictive laws (Lichten- 
berger, 1931:171). (The exception to this trend, noted by Lichtenber- 
ger, has been the grounds for divorce, one aspect of divorce law which 
has not become more stringent.) This relationship between increasing
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Table 6.
Variable
AGE
INDUST
MGRATE
SCORE70S
Multiple Regression Analysis with Decade-Specific Divorce Rate
Measures on the Divorce Law Index: 1970s Divorce Score Index
Zero-Order 
Correlation Coefficient 
(r)
Standardized 
Regression Coefficient 
(BETA)
-.242 -.280
. 166 .286
.226 .287
-.046 -.140
R2 = .199
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Table 7. Multiple Regression Analysis with Decade-Specific Divorce Rate
Measures on the Divorce Law Index: 1960s Divorce Rate Change
Variable Zero-Order 
Correlation Coefficient 
(r)
Standardized 
Regression Coefficient 
(BETA)
AGE -.242 -.281
INDUST . 166 .260
MGRATE .226 .241
CHNG60S -.216 -.192
R2 = .218
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Table 8.
Variable
AGE
INDUST
MGRATE
CHNG70S
Multiple Regression Analysis with Decade-Specific Divorce Rate
Measures on the Divorce Law Index: 1970s Divorce Rate Change
Zero-Order 
Correlation Coefficient 
(r)
Standardized 
Regression Coefficient 
(BETA)
-.242
.166
.226
.158
-.265
.281
.220
.115
R2 = .195
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rates and legal reform relates to the "legalistic habit of mind" also 
discussed by Lichtenberger (1931:162). Society identifies a social 
problem, enacts legislation to control the problem, and expects the law 
to affect behavior. This pattern of legislative reaction continued in 
divorce law despite evidence indicating that the restrictive laws did 
not influence divorce rates. The no-fault laws appear to be in part a 
continuation of this trend. They may be characterized as a reaction to 
increasing divorce rates rather than a catalyst for further increase. 
States experiencing relatively high divorce rate increases during the 
1960s were likely to pass no-fault legislation. These states in turn 
experienced relatively low divorce rate increases during the 1970s, a 
result not seen in the effect of the earlier restrictive measures.
The conclusion drawn from this research is that "there is a rela­
tionship between divorce laws and divorce rates but that it is demon­
strated when the laws are viewed as an effect of increasing rates rather 
than a potential cause of them.
Remaining Independent Variables
Multiple regression analysis shows that migration, unemployment and 
age distribution of the population are positively related to the divorce 
score index (Table 4, page 57). For this reason hypotheses 2a, 2e and 
2f (page 34) are accepted. The regression analysis also shows a nega­
tive relationship between Catholicism and the divorce score index, which 
leads to acceptance of hypothesis 1b (page 34).
The hypothesis concerning the relationship between the divorce rate 
and the proportion of the population with a high school education is not 
accepted because the direction of the relationship is opposite from the
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predicted direction. A ^ possible explanation for the increase in divorce 
score accompanying increases in the education measure is the greater ac­
cessibility to alternative attractions outside the marriage. In states 
where more people have a high school diploma the wherewithal to obtain 
rewards from other sources increases. There is no way to tell whether 
states with high education scores have more residents with advanced edu­
cation, a factor which is associated with increasing marital instability 
for women (Glick, 1975). Also, education shows an impact significantly 
different from income (BETA = -0.284, not shown in Tables) although the 
two variables are highly correlated (r = 0.600) and act similarly in 
micro-level studies. This difference in impact is due in part to the 
fact that income is an aggregate measure in which husbands would be ex­
pected to contribute the larger proportion, while education level is an 
individual characteristic in which spouses are often similar. Further­
more, the relationship between education and divorce is influenced by 
sex and duration of education. Its complexity as a predictor variable 
may account for part of the difference revealed in empirical analysis.
The remaining hypotheses cannot be accepted. The predictive abil­
ity of the other independent variables is not sufficient to suggest a 
relationship between them and state divorce rates. It is noted, how­
ever, that the direction of the relationships is as predicted (except 
for the variable ONECHILD) even though the strength of the relation­
ships suggest little or no impact on the dependent variable.
The discrepancy in the expected and the actual direction for the 
proportion of the population having one child at home may be a function 
of the length of marriage, a variable not measured in this study. Cou­
ples having one child are more likely to be in the early years of
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marriage which are disproportionately divorce-prone years (see Becker, 
1977:1144). The variable reflecting the presence of any number of chil­
dren at home (CHILD18) does reveal the expected relationship with the 
divorce score (BETA = -0.221, not shown).
Migration is the strongest predictor of divorce rates (r = 0.750; 
BETA = 0.614). The strong positive relationship between migration and 
divorce has been reported and discussed in previous research (Fenelon, 
1971; Pang and Hanson, 1968). It is explained by Fenelon (1971) in terms 
of a social cost model similar to the framework used in this paper. He 
notes that system stability, social integration and absence of population 
change are all interrelated. A mobile population is relatively less in­
tegrated and therefore less subject to social restraints in general and 
the impact of social costs of divorce in particular. Social barriers 
are not strong to begin with in these areas and therefore are less likely 
to inhibit divorce decisions.
The reason for this is better understood through a consideration of 
the distinction between primitive (mechanical) societies and modern (or­
ganic) societies as discussed by Durkheim (1933). The former are char­
acterized by a strongly held collective conscience, little division of 
labor, and solidarity through common values. The latter exhibit indi­
viduated consciences, and functional interdependence which forms the 
basis for social solidarity. Thus, individualization increases as mod­
ernization of society continues and the scope of social control vis-a- 
vis shared values concurrently decreases. There are more and more items 
and events subject to evaluation by the collective conscience at the 
same time that there is less consensus on that collective conscience.
The net result is greater latitude for individual behavior in areas
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where the division of l^bor (and thus the organic solidarity) is most 
advanced.
A comparison of the multiple regression analysis on the divorce 
score and on each of its component variables indicates that basically 
the same factors are important in explaining variations in all three 
measures (Table 4, page 57; Table 9, page 71; Table 10, page 72). Edu­
cation drops out of the equation for RATECHNG and QRTILE, while MGRATE 
is included in QRTILE prediction. None of these changes are extensive. 
The drop in BETA for Catholicism on the rate change variable is ex­
pected since the rate is not increasing significantly among Catholics.
Regressing the independent variables on the divorce law index pro­
duces a different set of predictor variables (Table 5, page 62). Age 
distribution is the only variable common to all four regression equa­
tions. This suggests that a different set of dynamics are operating on 
the law variable than on measures of the divorce rate.
Migration and Catholicism, which together account for almost sixty 
percent of the variance explained in the divorce score index (R =
0.592, not shown), are not present in the divorce law equation. The 
salience of the two variables, and to some extent unemployment, suggest 
that social solidarity factors are important in understanding divorce 
rates. Where social barriers against divorce are high, the divorce 
rates are low.
The influence of social integration is seen indirectly and to a 
lesser extent in the regression on divorce law where industrialization 
is a factor. For historical reasons the northeast section of our coun­
try has been the most industrialized. These states also are generally 
characterized by high population stability and high proportions of
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Table 9. Multiple Regression Analysis on the Divorce Rate Change,
1960-1978
Variable Zero-Order Standardized
Correlation Coefficient Regression Coefficient
(r) (BETA)
MIGRATN .584 .613
UNEMPLOY .328 .212
AGE -.200 .268
DIVLAWR -.075 .120
CATHOLIC -.272 -.138
INCOME .298 .048
R2 = 0.435
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Table 10. Multiple Regression Analysis on the 1978 Quartile Ranking by
Divorce Rate
Variable Zero-Order 
Correlation Coefficient 
(r)
Standardized 
Regression Coefficient 
(BETA)
MIGRATN .676 .542
CATHOLIC -.558 -.332
AGE -.300 .266
UNEMPLOY .249 .192
MGRATE .511 .199
R2 = 0.627
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Catholic residents. They tend to have restrictive divorce laws. In 
fact, only one of the breakdown-only states (DIVLAWR = 1) is found in the 
northeast or east north central regions. Most of these states have mixed 
grounds for divorce. The predicted impact on the law index by industri­
alization would have been a negative relationship. This is because of 
the increasing interdependence of the major institutions of society as 
growth and development continue. Increasing individualism, and decreas­
ing dependence on the family, are generally considered to be associated 
with industrialization. They are also assumed to be related to reduction 
in barrier strength of social constraints against divorce. The positive 
BETA in the regression could be a result of collinearity with the MIGRATN 
and CATHOLIC variables discussed above.
Marriage rates and the presence of one child at home are two vari­
ables with an impact on the divorce law not seen on the divorce rate. 
These factors suggest the salience of values of familism. States with 
high scores on these measures have more persons "at risk" in liberaliza­
tion of divorce laws. Married couples and parents have a vested inter­
est in ensuring the continuation of marriage and family stability and 
the rewards they gain from this stability. In a separate analysis con­
ducted as part of this research an effect of marital status was found on
4
attitudes toward divorce law. Data gathered by the National Opinion Re­
search Center (NORC) as part of its General Social Surveys for the years 
1974-1978 indicate that when asked if divorce should be easier or more
^The data discussed are taken from the General Social Surveys (GSS) 
Cumulative Codebook (NORC, 1978) and are available on file tape at the 
Computer Center of the College of William and Mary. They are responses 
from a national sample of English-speaking persons 18 years of age or 
older drawn independently each year as described in the codebook. Re­
sponses are not available by state but are used here because they
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difficult to obtain than it was at the time of the interview, forty- 
eight percent of all respondents answered that it should be more diffi­
cult (Table 11, page 75). However, over half of the married and widowed 
respondents gave this answer. The proportion of divorced, separated and 
never-married persons expressing this opinion was lower than the average.
Results from the divorce law regression and the NORC data analysis 
are mutually supportive if one is willing to assume that public policy 
is related to public opinion. Theoretical and empirical research indi­
cates that this is a valid assumption (Luttbeg, 1974). Legislators in 
states having higher proportions of married persons and lower propor­
tions of divorced persons would be less likely to support lenient di­
vorce laws because of the unfavorable social climate.
While there is some overlap in the dynamics influencing the law in­
dex and the rate index, there appears to be a difference in emphasis.
The divorce score index relates more directly to extradyadic factors as­
sociated with levels of social integration. This finding supports the 
assumptions in the exchange typology presented in Chapter Three (page 27). 
Divorce rates are higher in states where external pressures are lower. 
These states have larger proportions of couples located in quadrants II 
and III (low stability), with a greater concentration in quadrant III 
since the intradyadic tensions accompanying unemployment can contribute 
in part to marital dissatisfaction and shift the position toward lower
provide an indication of attitudes throughout the country. Although 
some researchers question the validity of public opinion polls, this 
writer concurs with Scanzoni (1970:27) that following years of survey 
research there is no indication that any sector of the population tends 
to falsify information, and that in fact there appears to be "remark­
able candor" on even the most sensitive issues. The responses in the 
GSS are accepted as a valid reflection of public opinion about divorce 
laws.
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quality. The difference^in dynamics between the divorce rate and the law 
variables can be seen in the fact that the divorce law index varies more 
with intradyadic factors relating especially to preservation of rewards 
of marriage and presence of a family lifestyle. Graphically, states with 
restrictive laws are likely to have more couples located in quadrants I 
and II, where marital quality is high, than are states with lenient laws.
Methodological Considerations
The findings and discussion presented in this chapter are based on 
macro-level analysis of state divorce rates and laws. It cannot be con­
cluded that the same control variables will be important factors in pre­
dicting the likelihood of termination for particular marriages. Fur­
thermore it cannot be implied that divorce law reform does not influence 
individual divorce decisions. The findings here relate to character­
istics of states and deal with the environmental aspects of divorce 
decisions.
The cross-sectional design eliminated the need for some of the pro­
cedures used in previous quasiexperimental and modified time-series de­
signs (Mazur-Hart and Berman, 1977; Wright and Stetson, 1978). For 
example it was not necessary to make adjustments, as Wright and Stetson 
(1978) did, on reform states* divorce rates based on an averaged measure 
of increase in no-reform states. It did introduce discrepancies in time 
of variable measurement. Scores were obtained on some variables as 
early as 1970, while others reflect data from as late as 1978. However, 
the time of measurement for each variable is consistent for all states. 
The fact that a diversity of research designs produced the same results 
suggests that the finding of no effect of the adoption of no-fault
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divorce laws on increasing divorce rates is not a methodological 
artifact.
It might be suspected that the use of the RATECHNG variable in con­
struction of the divorce score index biased the results by relying only 
on scores at the extremes of the period studied without accounting for 
variations in rates within that time frame. In the early stages of re­
search the divorce rates for each state during the eighteen year period 
were ploted and the graphs examined for the anticipated J-curves (see 
page 33) and for any other patterns or irregularities which might appear. 
With very few exceptions the rate patterns were strikingly consistent 
within each state and across states. Beginning approximately in 1965 
there has been a steady rise in state divorce rates continuing through 
1978. In Kentucky, Illinois, Alabama and Arizona the' smoothness of this 
upward trend was interrupted for a few years early in the series, after 
which the overall pattern was in line with the national trend. Specific 
reasons for these irregularities were not known but they appeared to be 
unique to these states and they did not provide sufficient reason to 
suspect that the rate change variable would mask information relevant to 
the purposes of this study.
Furthermore, the graphs failed to reveal the occurrence of short 
term effects of the no-fault reforms. Increases in California have been 
attributed to the drop in native Californians "migrating" to Nevada for 
a divorce and returning home afterward. The notoriously high Nevada di­
vorce rate did drop following passage of no-fault in California and con­
tinues to drop today despite the national trend upward. As in other 
states, however, this trendline was already established prior to the ad­
vent of no-fault legislation. This does suggest, however, that migratory
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divorces and the vitality of divorce "mills" in general may decrease as 
divorce becomes more readily available throughout the nation. Immediate 
post-reform changes in other state divorce rates did not represent sub­
stantial or sustained changes in the slope of the divorce rate, leading 
to the conclusion that short-term effects, where present, are minimal.
CHAPTER SEVEN
IMPLICATIONS 
Implications for Future Research
There is substantial evidence to support acceptance of the null hy­
pothesis concerning the impact of no-fault divorce on state divorce 
rates. Additional study of this relationship at this time is not likely 
to produce different results although it would help clarify some of the 
relationships among the dependent and independent variables examined. 
Because permissiveness of law is the only law-related factor with a dem­
onstrated impact on divorce rates it would be helpful to develop a mea­
surement technique for this variable applicable to both fault and no- 
fault legislation. If available, such a measure would permit an updated 
examination of the significance of this relationship. It is also sug­
gested that a measurement technique permitting empirical analysis of 
public awareness of divorce legislation might help explain variation in 
the impact of legislative reform. Finally, this research suggests that 
it would be fruitful to focus on divorce law policies as a dependent 
variable in order to better understand the relationship between divorce 
law and divorce rates. This approach appears to be unexplored in the 
empirical literature, although Zuckman (1975:15), Wright and Stetson 
(1978:580) and others suggest without further comment the possibility 
that laws are a result rather than a cause of increasing divorce rates 
and changing family lifestyle. Additional study in this area is needed
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to provide further evidence about the presence of this relationship and 
the dynamics involved in it.
Policy Implications
The findings of this study offer additional support for proponents 
of no-fault divorce legislation and reassurance to those who oppose it 
out of fear that it will magnify the problem of high, ever-increasing 
divorce rates. Whatever other impact it may have on divorce in the var­
ious states, no-fault divorce is not likely to influence the divorce rate 
of states. Legislators in states which have not adopted no-fault reform 
can benefit from this knowledge as they consider the possibility of fu­
ture reform in their respective states.
At the same time all states must be aware of the phenomenon of un­
anticipated consequences associated with any legislative reform. Rose 
(1968:35) notes that laws are attempts to deal with social problems; 
that they usually transform the problem in some unanticipated way; and
that in the process they often create new social problems, A good exam­
ple of this is the traditional fault-based divorce laws, which resulted 
ultimately in disrespect for the legal process and sham in the court­
room. Many opponents of no-fault laws would suggest that the phenomenon 
of divorce on demand is the first indication of an unanticipated trans­
formation of the divorce problem, but others would maintain that this 
result was both anticipated and accepted at the outset. No-fault legis­
lation is still a new concept in divorce law. It has not been further 
delineated through court interpretation and rulings on definition and 
application. Its impact at the individual level is unclear. Time will
be an important factor. Attention must be given to potential consequences
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as they become evident before the full impact of the new policies can be 
determined. Proceeding with caution appears to be a reasonable course of 
action in view of the historical and empirical evidence.
The view of divorce law as an example of culture lag appears to be a 
realistic one. By the nature of the control function of laws, they lag 
behind social change. Fault-free procedures for the dissolution of mar­
riage is an opportunity for the law to catch up with reality. The new 
laws recognize the emergence of a new concept of marriage and the family 
for which the traditional fault-based divorce process is inappropriate.
As the new ideas become entrenched, new laws compatible with the new so­
cial reality will be required. This is a necessary and desirable step 
if the current attitudes toward marriage and family life prevail.
It is further suggested that the utility' of the new laws goes a step 
beyond allowing law to catch up to reality. It also permits the develop­
ment of society to continue uniformly. From the Durkheimian perspective 
it might be said that the traditional divorce laws prevented the expres­
sion of individual consciences in modern society by subjecting all indi­
viduals to inappropriate societal control. The new laws do not seek to 
punish individuals for offensive marital wrongdoing because divorce is no 
longer considered an obvious social evil the way it once was. No-fault 
legislation seeks to regulate the dissolution process rather than in­
hibit the dissolution of marriages. It changes the nature of the law 
more toward the restitutive type found in societies characterized by or­
ganic solidarity (Durkheim, 1933:111). Since the components of society 
are interdependent, this change toward organic solidarity in the legal 
arena enables all society, including the institution of marriage and the 
family, to evolve more fully.
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The tendency to re^y on law to solve social problems has been recog­
nized. However, it has been pointed out numerous times (Mowrer, 1924; 
Levinger, 1965; Wheeler, 1974; Glendon, 1977) that divorce is the symp­
tom, not the disease; the effect, not the cause of marital breakdown.
The actual causes of divorce are outside the domain of the law and are 
neither produced by it nor subject to any considerable degree to its 
control (Lichtenberger, 1931:208). If the goal is to control the divorce 
problem then it will be necessary to focus attention of the dynamics in­
volved in the causes of marital breakdown and ways to intervene in the 
process of breakdown before it is complete. Recognizing the limitations 
of the law in its ability to influence divorce helps explain why restric­
tive laws have been less effective than one might anticipate. The im­
plication for policy-makers is not to fear relaxation of these laws. 
Levinger (1965:28) suggests that increases in barriers (divorce laws in­
cluded) is actually the least effective means of making a lasting in­
crease in marital cohesiveness because barrier maintenance does not in­
crease the internal attractions of marriage.
Public opinion polls, professional journals and popular magazines 
all reflect the perceived need for change in divorce procedures. No­
fault divorce appears to have much to recommend it. Without abandoning 
the control function of law and without approving of divorce it provides 
a less painful and more realistic mechanism for terminating marriages 
which cannot be saved. Its success in much of the nation is likely to 
recommend it to other areas, especially in the absence of workable al­
ternative reform measures.
A long-range policy implication can also be made based on the evi­
dence presented. It is possible that uniformity in divorce law may be
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achieved passively a century after active attempts first failed to bring 
it about. The trend toward adoption of no-fault divorce laws, begun in 
the 1970s, continues in the early 1980s. In time all states may at least 
include a breakdown provision in their divorce laws. These statutes are 
already quite similar with respect to "grounds” for divorce, recognizing 
perceived marital breakdown as sufficient cause. They differ on divorce- 
related issues of child custody and support, property division, et cetera. 
However, recent concern and publicity over interstate custody disputes 
may rekindle desire for greater uniformity. Uniformity may never be com­
pletely realized, but a fair approximation may result from continuing no­
fault reform. This would be another success story for the National Con­
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, even though the final 
form would most likely differ from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 
first approved in the 1970s.
Implications for Family Stability
Increasing divorce rates have been viewed both historically and 
empirically as an indicator of increasing family instability in the in­
stitution of marriage and the family. Factors contributing to one were 
also associated with the other. Because no-fault divorce legislation 
has not further increased state divorce rates it is concluded that this 
new approach to divorce does not pose a threat to family stability. As 
a mechanism of social control the no-fault laws attempt to maintain the 
social order, just as traditional fault-based laws did for so many years. 
The difference is that the institutions of marriage and the family have 
undergone considerable change since the first laws were enacted. The 
new laws reflect these changes; the older ones do not.
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It must be recognised that marriage and the family are undergoing 
social change. It is not surprising that definitions, attitudes and 
controls appropriate to one time period will become inappropriate gener­
ations later. This is particularly true as the pace of social change 
continues to accelerate. Divorce, once an anomaly, is now considered a 
necessary adaptive feature of the family in the larger social system. 
Bohannon (1979:311) suggests that it is actually a back-up institution 
to the family, permitting essential functions to be performed in the 
wake of the dissolution of a family unit. In addition, divorce has been 
characterized as a time of regrouping (Bohannon, 1979:310). This is an 
important point because it underscores the fact that only through di­
vorce can remarriage be possible. Persons trapped in unviable marriages 
are able to establish new family units when permitted the opportunity to 
regroup. Remarriage rates indicate that, increasingly, formerly married 
persons are taking advantage of the opportunity to remarry. Data reveal 
that in 1960 the number of marriages per one thousand divorced or wid­
owed brides over thirteen years of age was 32.7. In 1970 the number was 
36.6 and by 1978 it had climbed to 40.0 (Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1980). These positive consequences of divorce are in­
creasingly recognized. By easing the restrictions on obtaining divorce 
the no-fault laws also ease the transition out of unstable marriages and 
into potentially stable relationships. Family stability as a concept is 
not endangered by this transition, although a particular marriage or 
family is dissolved in the process.
The net effect of all these changes, suggested by O'Neill (1977:73) 
is that divorce has become more a clinical issue than a moral problem. 
Glendon discusses this phenomenon in terms of the "dejuridification" of
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marriage and divorce, a process involving a return to forms of social 
control other than legal rules concerning the formation, dissolution, and 
organization of married life (Glendon, 1977:321). She believes that re­
cent legislative reform implies a shift in the posture of the State with 
respect to the family comparable to the shift which occurred when the 
State first assumed jurisdiction from ecclesiastical authorities. She 
argues that the State is actually more heavily involved in family matters 
than ever, but in a different way. Now government agencies are espe­
cially involved with the economic consequences of dissolution and with 
the welfare of children from both legal and ^e facto families (Glendon, 
1977:324). The viewpoint expressed by O'Neill, Glendon, and others sug­
gests that the process of increasing functional interdependence and in­
creasing latitude for the individual conscience continues today.
This discussion is not meant to imply that divorce is now a so­
cially acceptable phenomenon which causes no qualms for modern society. 
There is still opposition to legal reform and to total social acceptance 
of divorce and divorced persons. The compromise nature of our law il­
lustrates this. Even with respect to the no-fault legislation there has 
been compromise, with many states choosing an "add-on" approach to the 
reform. We have not "solved" the problem of divorce, but we have rede­
fined it and deal with it from a different perspective. Consequently 
the atmosphere is generally more conducive to more liberal laws.
The fact that remarriage rates are relatively high and increasing 
suggests that the increase in divorce rates has not damaged the viabil­
ity of marriage and the family. Both are highly valued today, as in the 
past. However, Scanzoni (1968) suggests the existence of a paradox in 
the values of many persons today. In a comparison of ongoing marriages
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and dissolved marriages jae found that participants from both groups held 
values of permanence and pragmatism in marriage, and they held these 
values simultaneously. In this study and in others this fact must be 
remembered in drawing implications. It is neither safe nor fair to as­
sume that high divorce rates indicate a wholesale rejection of family 
lifestyle and lifelong marriage ideals. It does suggest that increas­
ingly people are finding it necessary to take the pragmatic view of mar­
riage and justify divorce behavior on the basis of personal needs and 
satisfactions. Identification of this paradox provides further proof 
that family stability remains an ideal even as the concepts of marriage 
and the family evolve.
The significance for the individual of the no-fault concept is 
great. The societal impact is not destructive of family stability.
This was the intention of the reformers.
APPENDIX A
LIST OF STATES BY DIVORCE LAW CATEGORY, 1978
I. No-Fault Only
California
Iowa
Florida
Oregon
Colorado
Michigan
Kentucky
Nebraska
Nevada*
Washington
Arizona
II. Mixed
Breakdown plus Fault
Texas
Alabama
Idaho
New Hampshire 
North Dakota
Connecticut
Georgia
Maine
Massachusetts 
Rhode Island
Separation < 1 year plus Fault
North Carolina Wisconsin
New York Maryland
III. Fault Only
Separation > 1 year plus Fault
Utah New Jersey
South Carolina Ohio
Incompatibility plus Fault
Alaska Kansas
Oklahoma
Fault Only
Illinois Pennsylvania**
*Not included in empirical analysis.
**Added breakdown to existing grounds effective July
Missouri
Minnesota
Delaware
Montana
Wyoming
Mississippi 
Tennessee 
West Virginia 
Indiana*
Vermont
Virginia
Louisiana*
Arkansas*
New Mexico*
South Dakota
1980.
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APPENDIX B
SECONDARY SOURCES USED IN DATA COLLECTION
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979:
RACE (derived) 
ETHNIC 
WOMLABOR 
UNEMPLOY
INCOME
EDUCATN
MIGRATN
AGE
1970 Census of the Population:
URBAN 
CHILD18
ONECHILD
GE4CHILD
County and City Data Book, 1977:
INDUST
1980 Catholic Almanac:
CATHOLIC
Monthly Vital Statistics Report/Advance Report— Einal Divorce Statis­
tics, 1978:
DIV0RCE2
Monthly Vital Statistics Report/Advance Report— Final Marriage Statis­
tics , 1978:
MGRATE
Vital Statistics of the United States, 1970:
DIVORCE1
Hamilton, Harper. The No-Fault Divorce Guide:
NUMGRNDS (derived) DIVLAW (derived)
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